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Abstract: The federal government claims that the Fourth Amendment permits it to search 
digital information on cell phones, laptops, and other electronic devices at the international 
border without suspicion of criminal activity, much less a warrant. Until recently, federal 
courts have generally permitted these digital border searches, treating them no differently 
from searches of luggage. Courts that have limited digital border searches have required only 
that the government establish reasonable suspicion for the most exhaustive kind of digital 
search. The Supreme Court has not yet weighed in, but last year it held in Riley v. California 
that the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement does not apply to cell 
phones. This Comment analyzes how Riley affects the border search doctrine and concludes 
that it should change the debate in significant ways. First, Riley establishes that digital 
searches are categorically different from physical searches. This undermines the first wave of 
border search decisions and suggests that courts will have to analyze digital searches 
differently. Second, the Court recognized that digital searches could be even more intrusive 
than the search of one’s home. This finding weighs in favor of requiring at least reasonable 
suspicion, if not probable cause, for digital border searches. Third, the Court provides a test 
for determining when to deviate from the warrant requirement in light of new technology. 
The Court’s analysis on this question supports reconsidering whether the border search 
exception—traditionally applied to searches of persons and physical property—should apply 
to searches of digital information.  
INTRODUCTION 
Despite a variety of important individual interests in digital 
information, U.S. border agents seize and search cell phones, laptop 
computers, and other electronic devices of people entering and exiting 
the country without any suspicion of criminal activity.
1
 This is pursuant 
                                                     
* The author interned for the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California in 2014 and 
the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law in 2015. Both organizations 
have taken positions on digital border searches, but the author did not work for either organization 
on this issue. The views expressed in this Comment are the author’s alone.  
1. U.S. Customs and Border Protection “has often ignored opposing assertions of attorney-client 
privilege and Fourth Amendment rights, while pursuing the exercise of its almost unlimited 
authority to search for illegal materials.” Robert T. Givens, The Danger of U.S. Customs Searches 
for Returning Lawyers, GPSOLO, May/June 2013, at 39, 40, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/gp_solo/2013/may_june/the_danger_us_customs_searches
_returning_lawyers.html. “The best policy [for lawyers] is to have nothing on your person or in your 
baggage that you cannot have the government know about.” Id. at 41. Border officials recently 
stopped the Mayor of Stockton, California at San Francisco International Airport and confiscated a 
 
17 - Miller.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/21/2015  8:10 PM 
1944 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1943 
 
to official policy: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) have each passed 
directives authorizing agents to conduct these digital border searches.
2
 
The government contends that this intrusive power is justified by a broad 
interest in enforcing the law at the border,
3
 and argues in court that the 
practice is consistent with the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on 
unreasonable searches and seizures.
4
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet decided what level of process the 
Fourth Amendment requires for digital border searches, although it has 
set out general principles governing border searches.
5
 The Court has 
                                                     
personal cell phone, personal laptop, and city-owned laptop. The mayor was traveling to China on a 
business tour with other California mayors. Officials allowed him to leave custody only after he 
provided passwords to the devices. Officials returned the devices about a month later, after the 
mayor went to federal court. Roger Phillips, Mayor to Get His Electronics Back, THE RECORD (Oct. 
21, 2015), http://www.recordnet.com/article/20151021/NEWS/151029932. For additional examles 
of the interests at stake in digital border searches, see Ellen Nakashima, Clarity Sought on 
Electronics Searches: U.S. Agents Seize Travelers’ Devices, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2008, at A1, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/06/ 
AR2008020604763_pf.html (recounting story of a technology engineer who was asked by a federal 
agent to enter his password into his laptop computer and watched as the officer “copied the Web 
sites he had visited”); Sarah Abdurrahman, My Detainment Story, ON THE MEDIA (Sept. 30, 2013), 
http://www.onthemedia.org/story/my-detainment-story-or-how-i-learned-stop-feeling-safe-my-own-
country-and-hate-border-patrol/transcript/ (describing her experience as a Muslim-American 
journalist during a border search of cell phones); Geoffrey King, For Journalists Coming into US, 
Policies Border on the Absurd, COMM. TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Oct. 28, 2014), 
https://cpj.org/blog/2014/10/for-journalists-coming-into-us-policies-that-borde.php (discussing how 
journalists have had to change how they work because of invasive digital border searches). 
2. See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., BORDER SEARCH OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES CONTAINING 
INFORMATION (2009) [hereinafter CBP DIRECTIVE], available at http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/ 
files/documents/elec_mbsa_3.pdf; U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ICE DIRECTIVE 
NO. 7-6.1, BORDER SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES (2009) [hereinafter ICE DIRECTIVE], 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/7-6.1%20directive.pdf. Although the 
CBP Directive states that it was subject to review in 2012, it remains listed as current policy. See 
CBP Policy Regarding Border Search of Electronic Devices Containing Information, U.S. 
CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, http://www.cbp.gov/document/directives/cbp-policy-regarding-
border-search-electronic-devices-containing-information (last visited Sept. 30, 2015). 
3. E.g., CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 2, § 1, at 1. “Searches of electronic devices help detect 
evidence relating to terrorism and other national security matters, human and bulk cash smuggling, 
contraband, and child pornography. They can also reveal information about financial and 
commercial crimes, such as those relating to copyright, trademark and export control violations.” 
Id.; see also id. § 4, at 2 (citing federal statutes relating to immigration, customs, monetary 
instruments, and exports). 
4. See, e.g., United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2013) (the government 
“sought a broad ruling that no suspicion of any kind was required” for digital border searches); 
United States v. Kim, No. 13-cr-00100-ABJ, 2015 BL 134375, at *1 (D.D.C. May 8, 2015), 
available at https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/kimruling.pdf (the government 
argued that the laptop search was routine and did not require reasonable suspicion). 
5. See infra Part I.B–C. 
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held that border officials may conduct “routine” searches of persons and 
personal property at the border without suspicion of criminal activity or 
a warrant.
6
 The Court has indicated that “nonroutine” searches may 
require a heightened standard of process.
7
 For example, a search that is 
particularly destructive to personal property or highly intrusive to 
personal dignity may be nonroutine and require some level of suspicion.
8
 
The lower federal courts have faced the difficult task of sorting out 
how to apply the Supreme Court’s border search decisions—which 
involved searches of physical property and the temporary seizure of 
persons—to searches of digital information accessible through 
computers and cell phones. There are two main developments in the case 
law.
9
 At first, most federal courts rejected challenges to digital border 
searches under the Fourth Amendment and, for the most part, concluded 
that border agents did not need any level of suspicion.
10
  
More recent cases suggest the emergence of a second trend. In 2013, 
the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Cotterman
11
 that the Fourth 
Amendment requires border agents to show reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity before conducting a “forensic” digital search of a 
computer that could reveal deleted files.
12
 In doing so, the court 
narrowed its 2008 decision in United States v. Arnold,
13
 in which it had 
held that no suspicion was required for any digital border search.
14
 
                                                     
6. See infra Part I.B–C. 
7. See infra Part I.B–C. 
8. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155–56 (2004) (“While it may be true that 
some searches of property are so destructive as to require [some level of suspicion], this was not one 
of them.”); id. at 152 (identifying “dignity and privacy interests of the person being searched” as 
“reasons that might support a requirement of some level of suspicion in the case of highly intrusive 
searches of the person”); cf. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 618 n.13 (1977) (“We do not 
decide whether, and under what circumstances, a border search might be deemed ‘unreasonable’ 
because of the particularly offensive manner in which it is carried out.”). 
9. See infra Part II. 
10. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 729 F.3d 517, 525–26 (6th Cir. 2013) (concluding that the 
nonforensic examination of a laptop computer occurring twenty miles away from the international 
airport was a continuation of a routine border search and did not require reasonable suspicion); 
United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the Fourth Amendment 
does not protect electronic devices, including computers and cell phones, from warrantless and 
suspicionless searches in border context); United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 504 (4th Cir. 2005) 
(same); United States v. Linarez-Delgado, 259 F. App’x 506, 508 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that there 
is no reasonable suspicion required for a routine border search of “[d]ata storage media and 
electronic equipment, such as films, computer devices, and videotapes”). 
11. 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013). 
12. Id. at 956–57.  
13. 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008). 
14. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 960 n.6. 
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Nevertheless, the debate in both lines of cases is limited to whether 
border officials must meet the lowest level of process required under the 




The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Riley v. California,
16
 
should spark a change in the doctrine in significant ways. In Riley, the 
Court declined to extend the search incident to arrest exception to cell 
phones and held that police officers must obtain a warrant before 
searching a cell phone incident to arrest.
17
 The Court recognized that 
digital searches are categorically distinct from searches of physical 
objects.
18
 The Court definitively rejected analogies between digital 
information accessible by cell phones and physical property
19
—one of 
the principal rationales underlying Arnold and other decisions holding 
that no suspicion is required for a digital border search.
20
 This part of the 
Court’s analysis should push lower courts to distinguish digital searches 
from searches of physical belongings.  
The Court also established that digital searches can be more intrusive 
than even the search of one’s home.
21
 This weighs in favor of requiring 
at least reasonable suspicion, if not probable cause, for digital border 
searches. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Riley provides a test 
for deciding whether to deviate from the Fourth Amendment’s baseline 
warrant requirement in light of new technology.
22
 The Court’s analysis 
on this question supports reconsidering whether to apply the border 
search exception to digital searches.  
While the scholarly debate largely reflects the pre-Riley debate 
analysis in the federal courts over reasonable suspicion,
23
 this Comment 
                                                     
15. Id. at 968–70; Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1008. 
16. __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
17. Id. at 2485. 
18. See infra notes 278–82 and accompanying text. 
19. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2488–89. 
20. Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1009. 
21. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491. 
22. See infra Part III.A. 
23. See Patrick E. Corbett, The Future of the Fourth Amendment in a Digital Evidence Context: 
Where Would the Supreme Court Draw the Electronic Line at the International Border?, 81 MISS. 
L.J. 1263 (2012); John Palfrey, The Public and the Private at the United States Border with 
Cyberspace, 78 MISS. L.J. 241 (2008); Samuel A. Townsend, Note, Laptop Searches at the Border 
and United States v. Cotterman, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1745 (2014); Michael Creta, Comment, A Step in 
the Wrong Direction: The Ninth Circuit Requires Reasonable Suspicion for Forensic Examinations 
of Electronic Storage Devices During Border Searches in United States v. Cotterman, 55 B.C. L. 
REV. E-SUPPLEMENT 31 (2014); Matthew B. Kugler, Comment, The Perceived Intrusiveness of 
Searching Electronic Devices at the Border: An Empirical Study, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1165 (2014); 
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examines the implications of Riley and its potential to change how courts 
assess the reasonableness of digital border searches.
24
 In short, Riley 
supports a higher level of process for digital border searches than what 
courts currently require and impliedly settles the debate over reasonable 
suspicion for forensic searches. Further, Riley opens up a doctrinal path 
for courts to reconsider whether to extend the border search exception to 
the warrant requirement—traditionally applied to searches of persons 
and personal property—to searches of digital information. After Riley, 
courts should require, at a minimum, reasonable suspicion for all digital 
border searches and perhaps even a warrant supported by probable 
cause. 
Indeed, lower courts are already grappling with differing 
interpretations of Riley in digital border search cases.
25
 The Fourth 
Circuit may be the first federal court of appeals to take on the issue in 
light of these developments following an appeal filed in United States v. 
Saboonchi.
26
 In that case, the defendant and amici argue on appeal that, 
                                                     
Sid Nadkarni, Comment, “Let’s Have a Look, Shall We?” A Model for Evaluating Suspicionless 
Border Searches of Portable Electronic Devices, 61 UCLA L. REV. 148 (2013); Benjamin Rankin, 
Note, Restoring Privacy at the Border: Extending the Reasonable Suspicion Standard for Laptop 
Border Searches, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 301 (2011); Rachel Flipse, Comment, An 
Unbalanced Standard: Search and Seizure of Electronic Devices Under the Border Search 
Doctrine, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 851 (2010); Scott J. Upright, Note, Suspicionless Border Seizures 
of Electronic Files: The Overextension of the Border Search Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 291 (2009); Sunil Bector, Note, Your Laptop, Please: The Search and 
Seizure of Electronic Devices at the United States Border, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 695 (2009); 
Rasha Alzahabi, Note, Should You Leave Your Laptop at Home When Traveling Abroad?: The 
Fourth Amendment and Border Searches of Laptop Computers, 41 IND. L. REV. 161 (2008); 
Christine A. Coletta, Note, Laptop Searches at the United States Borders and the Border Search 
Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 48 B.C. L. REV. 971 (2007); Kelly A. Gilmore, Note, 
Preserving the Border Search Doctrine in a Digital World: Reproducing Electronic Evidence at the 
Border, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 759, 761–64 (2007); see also Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth 
Amendment Aspects of Computer Searches and Seizures: A Perspective and a Primer, 75 MISS. L.J. 
193 (2005) (discussing computer searches under the Fourth Amendment more generally). 
24. Gretchen C.F. Shappert noted that the government conceded in Riley that digital searches 
incident to arrest “may not be stretched” to include files accessible through a cell phone but stored 
remotely. Gretchen C.F. Shappert, The Border Search Doctrine: Warrantless Searches of Electronic 
Devices After Riley v. California, 62 U.S. ATT’YS’ BULL., Nov. 2014, at 1, 13. She concluded that 
the same principle would apply to digital border searches, though she did not elaborate as to why: 
“If a search incident to arrest ‘may not be stretched’ to cover cloud data, then a routine border 
search ‘may not be stretched’ either.” Id. 
25. See, e.g., United States v. Kim, No. 13-cr-00100-ABJ, 2015 BL 134375, at *2 (D.D.C. May 
8, 2015), available at https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/kimruling.pdf 
(holding a digital border search was unreasonable under the Riley balancing test analysis); United 
States v. Saboonchi, 48 F. Supp. 3d 815, 816 (D. Md. 2014) (denying motion for reconsideration in 
light of Riley and affirming holding that reasonable suspicion is required for a forensic search of 
digital devices seized at the border). 
26. 990 F. Supp. 2d 536 (2014); Notice of Appeal, United States v. Saboonchi, No. PWG-13-100, 
 
17 - Miller.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/21/2015  8:10 PM 
1948 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1943 
 
under Riley, the Fourth Amendment requires border agents to obtain a 




This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the border 
search exception generally. Part II discusses digital border searches, 
focusing on the two major trends in the case law, including a split over 
whether a search of digital information should be treated differently 
from a search of physical items. Part III discusses Riley, its implications 
for other digital searches, and how courts have debated Riley’s impact on 
digital border searches thus far. Part III concludes with an analysis of 
what courts should take away from Riley when assessing the 
constitutionality of digital border searches. 
I. BORDER SEARCHES 
Every year, millions of people travel into and out of the United States 
with cell phones, tablets, laptops, digital cameras, and other electronic 
devices.
28
 In 2013, 180 million people took international flights serving 
the United States.
29
 A recent survey found that nearly all (ninety-four 
percent) of United States adult airline passengers brought at least one 
portable electronic device with them onto an aircraft while traveling in 
the past twelve months.
30
 In 2014, 236 million people legally entered the 
United States from Canada and Mexico, traveling in personal vehicles 
(nearly 189 million), buses (over 5 million), and trains (nearly 295,000), 
                                                     
2015 WL 410506 (D. Md. Feb. 24, 2015).  
27. Brief of Appellant at 8–9, United States v. Saboonchi, No. 15-4111 (4th Cir. Feb. 25, 2015); 
Brief of Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union and American Civil Liberties Union of 
Maryland in Support of Defendant-Appellant at 2–3, Saboonchi, No. 15-4111 (Sept. 3, 2015) 
[hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU]; Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation 
in Support of Appellant at 4, Saboonchi, No. 15-4111 (Sept. 3, 2015) [hereinafter Brief of Amicus 
Curiae EFF]. 
28. See U.S. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., A REPORT FROM THE PORTABLE ELECTRONIC DEVICES 
AVIATION RULEMAKING COMMITTEE TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON EXPANDING THE USE OF PORTABLE ELECTRONIC DEVICES DURING FLIGHT 
app. H, at H-8 (2013), available at http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/ped/media/PED_ 
ARC_FINAL_REPORT.pdf.  
29. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TOTAL PASSENGERS ON U.S AIRLINES AND FOREIGN AIRLINES 
SERVING THE U.S. INCREASED 1.3% IN 2013 FROM 2012 (2014), available at 
http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/bts13_14.pdf. 
30. U.S. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 28. The survey found that twenty-eight percent of 
travelers used smartphones on flights, twenty-five percent used laptop computers, twenty-three 
percent used tablets, twenty-three percent used digital audio or MP3 players, and thirteen percent 
used e-readers. Id. app. H, at H-12. Of those traveling with a portable electronic device, ninety-nine 
percent took at least one device on the plane as a carry-on item. Id. app. H, at H-11. 
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as well as by foot (nearly 42 million).
31
 
Almost all adults in the United States own cell phones. In 2012, 
ninety percent of American adults owned a cell phone.
32
 An estimated 
eighty-five percent of Americans aged eighteen to twenty-four owned a 
smartphone in 2014.
33
 Half of American adults owned either a tablet or 
an e-reader at the start of 2014.
34
 Indeed, smartphones have “outpaced 
nearly any comparable technology in the leap to mainstream use.”
35
 As 
one court recently put it: “Smartphones, in particular, have become so 
deeply embedded in day-to-day activities that travelers cannot 
reasonably be expected to travel without them.”
36
 
Americans use personal electronic devices, and smartphones in 
particular, in personal ways. Smartphones invite users to share 
information in a variety of ways—from sending and receiving texts, 
email, and photos to making video calls, managing a calendar, buying 
things online, and browsing the internet—and people make full use of 
these functions.
37
 An estimated sixty-two percent of Americans used 
their smartphone to get information about a health condition in the past 
year and fifty-seven percent have used their smartphone for online 
banking.
38
 Smartphones also gather, retain, and transmit location 
information. For example, Apple’s iPhone logs the frequent locations of 
                                                     
31. Border Crossing/Entry Data: Query Detailed Statistics, U.S. DEPARTMENT TRANSP., 
BUREAU TRANSP. STAT., http://transborder.bts.gov/programs/international/transborder/TBDR_BC/ 
TBDR_BCQ.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2015) (select options for “All Border Ports,” “2014,” 
“Annual Summary,” “Aggregate all Ports,” and “All Measures Detail”; then click “Submit” to 
retrieve data) (based on data from the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection, Office of Field Operations). 
32. Mobile Technology Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CENTER, http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-
sheets/mobile-technology-fact-sheet/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2015) (webpage updated when new data 
is available; included numbers are current as of January 2014 and are based on 2012 data).  
33. Mobile Millennials: Over 85% of Generation Y Owns Smartphones, NIELSEN (Sept. 5, 2014), 
http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2014/mobile-millennials-over-85-percent-of-
generation-y-owns-smartphones.html. 
34. Kathryn Zickuhr & Lee Rainie, E-Reading Rises as Device Ownership Jumps, PEW RES. 
CENTER (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/01/16/e-reading-rises-as-device-
ownership-jumps/. 
35. Michael DeGusta, Are Smart Phones Spreading Faster than Any Technology in Human 
History?, M.I.T. TECH. REV. (May 9, 2012), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/427787/are-
smart-phones-spreading-faster-than-any-technology-in-human-history/ (emphasis in original). 
36. United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 539, 556 (D. Md. 2014). 
37. AARON SMITH ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., U.S. SMARTPHONE USE IN 2015, at 33 (2015), 
available at http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/03/PI_Smartphones_0401151.pdf (noting, for 
example, that ninety-seven percent of smartphone users used text messaging, eighty-nine percent 
used the internet, eighty-eight percent used email, seventy-five percent used social networking, and 
sixty percent took pictures or video). 
38. Id. at 5. 
17 - Miller.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/21/2015  8:10 PM 
1950 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1943 
 
its user and stores that information on the phone, creating an 
individualized map of daily routines.
39
 Many third-party smartphone 
applications track location information and increasingly condition 
services on collection of that information.
40
 
Border agents likely search the electronic devices of at least several 
thousand people annually. They searched electronic devices of 4957 
people from October 1, 2012 to August 31, 2013
41
 and 6671 people 
during a twenty-month period spanning 2008 to 2010.
42
 An electronic 
device search could include anything from a brief physical inspection to 
a search of the device’s contents to copying the device’s contents for the 
completion of a future forensic examination.
43
 The search could also 
involve retention of the device to enable a search or seizure of the device 
as evidence of a crime or for civil forfeiture.
44
 Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) considers electronic devices to be no different from 
physical containers such as luggage.
45
 
A. The Fourth Amendment: Warrant, Probable Cause, and 
Reasonable Suspicion 
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches or seizures.”
46
 The Amendment establishes a two-part structure 
                                                     
39. Molly McHugh, A Map in Your iPhone Is Tracking You. Here’s How to Zap It, WIRED (Nov. 
13, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/11/how-to-get-rid-of-the-iphone-map-that-tracks-you/. 
40. David Pierce, Location Is Your Most Critical Data, and Everyone’s Watching, WIRED (Apr. 
27, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/04/location/ (discussing increased business interest in 
individual location information, potential benefits to consumers for allowing businesses to track 
everywhere they go, and privacy tradeoffs). 
41. Susan Stellin, The Border Is a Back Door for U.S. Device Searches, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 
2013, at B1. 
42. See Government Data Regarding Electronic Device Searches, ACLU, 
https://www.aclu.org/national-security/government-data-regarding-electronic-device-searches (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2015) (summarizing CBP data released pursuant to Freedom of Information Act 
suit). A 2010 review conducted by CBP’s Office of Internal Affairs, Management and Inspection 
Division, found that CBP did not have a way to provide accurate data on border searches of 
electronic devices. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CIVIL RIGHTS/CIVIL LIBERTIES IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT: BORDER SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES DECEMBER 29, 2011, at 2, 7 (2011), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Redacted%20Report.pdf (partially 
redacted).  
43. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 42 at 2. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 7.  
46. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
17 - Miller.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/21/2015  8:10 PM 




 First, to determine whether the Fourth 
Amendment applies, courts assess whether the search invades an 
individual interest protected by the Amendment.
48
 Courts generally use 
the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test to determine whether a 
particular search implicates an interest protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.
49
 Under this test, an individual must exhibit a subjective 




Second, the Fourth Amendment requires searches to be 
“reasonable,”
51
 which “generally requires the obtaining of a judicial 
warrant” supported by probable cause.
52
 The policy behind the warrant 
requirement is to ensure that “the inferences to support a search are 
‘drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by 
the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime.’”
53
 The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that “searches 
                                                     
47. See THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 
§ 1.2, at 3–4 (2d ed. 2014). 
48. See id. § 1.2.1.2, at 7–10. 
49. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Peter P. Swire, 
Katz Is Dead. Long Live Katz, 102 MICH. L. REV. 904, 904 (2004) (calling Katz “the king of 
Supreme Court surveillance cases”). Some scholars have called for the Court to abandon the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 
51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1511 (2010) (“The reasonable expectation of privacy test has led to a 
contentious jurisprudence that is riddled with inconsistency and incoherence.”). In place of the Katz 
two-step, Professor Solove urges courts to provide regulation and oversight “whenever a particular 
government information gathering activity creates problems of reasonable significance.” Id. at 1514. 
Under Solove’s approach, courts should embrace the broad language of the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition against “unreasonable” searches and seizures to protect against “not only invasion of 
privacy, but also chilling of free speech, free association, freedom of belief, and consumption of 
ideas.” Id. 
50. See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 347, 361 (2000) (“Our Fourth Amendment analysis 
embraces two questions. First, we ask whether the individual, by his conduct, has exhibited an 
actual expectation of privacy . . . . Second, we inquire whether the individual’s expectation of 
privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” (citations omitted) (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
51. See Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (“[T]he ultimate touchstone 
of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’”(quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 
(2006))). 
52. See id. (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995)); Kentucky v. 
King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011) (“Although the text of the Fourth Amendment does not specify 
when a search warrant must be obtained, this Court has inferred that a warrant must generally be 
secured.”); cf. CLANCY, supra note 47, § 11.3, at 571 (discussing the five analytical models the 
Supreme Court uses to ascertain the reasonableness of a search: “the warrant preference model; the 
individualized suspicion model; the totality of the circumstances test; the balancing test; and a 
hybrid model giving dispositive weight to the common law”). 
53. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)). 
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conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge 
or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—




To obtain a warrant, police must establish probable cause by pointing 
to “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational 
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant th[e] intrusion.”
55
 The 
Court has described the probable cause standard as requiring a fair 
probability that the individual to be searched has committed the crime or 
that evidence of the crime will be found.
56
 Even if the Court finds that a 
search falls within an exception to the warrant requirement, it may still 
require that the search satisfy either probable cause
57
 or a lesser standard 
called “reasonable suspicion.”
58
 To establish reasonable suspicion, law 
enforcement officers must have a “particularized and objective basis for 
suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity” based on “the totality 
of the circumstances.”
59
 In sum, the Fourth Amendment establishes a 
                                                     
54. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357); see also King, 
563 U.S. at 459. There are a variety of exceptions to the Fourth Amendment probable cause and 
warrant requirements, including:  
[I]nvestigatory stops, investigatory detentions of property, searches incident to valid arrests, 
seizures of items in plain view, searches and seizures justified by exigent circumstances, 
consensual searches, searches of vehicles, searches of containers, inventory searches, border 
searches, searches at sea, administrative searches, and searches in which the special needs of 
law enforcement make the probable cause and warrant requirements impracticable. 
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 41 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 46 (2012). To obtain a 
warrant authorizing a search or seizure, the government must demonstrate to a judge or magistrate 
two elements. First, that there is “probable cause” to believe that a particular individual or group of 
individuals is engaged in criminal activity. See, e.g., Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 178 (2008); 
see also CLANCY, supra note 47, § 11.3.2.1.1, at 577–79. Second, the government must show there 
is probable cause to believe that the person, place, or thing to be searched has evidence of a crime. 
See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984). The government must have “reasonably 
trustworthy information” that is sufficient to “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that 
an offense has been or is being committed” or that the government will find evidence of a crime in 
the place to be searched. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (citations omitted) 
(internal quotations omitted). Many jurisdictions have made it possible to obtain a warrant quickly, 
even within five minutes. See Missouri v. McNeely, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1573 (2013) 
(Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
55. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 (1968). 
56. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 371 (2009). 
57. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34–35 (1963). 
58. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 
123 (2000); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981); Terry, 392 U.S. at 37; CLANCY, 
supra note 47, § 11.3.2.1.2, at 579. 
59. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417–18; see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (holding that to justify an intrusion 
on reasonable suspicion, an officer must be able “to point to specific and articulable facts which, 
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion”). 
17 - Miller.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/21/2015  8:10 PM 
2015] DIGITAL BORDER SEARCHES AFTER RILEY 1953 
 
baseline standard of a warrant supported by probable cause prior to the 
search.
60
 But, because “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’”
61
 the Court has delineated a range of 
lesser standards for limited exceptions, including probable cause without 
a warrant, reasonable suspicion, and no suspicion.
62
 Finally, under the 
Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement, all searches—whether 
pursuant to a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement—must 
be “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 
interference in the first place.”
63
 
B. The Border Search Exception 
Under the border search exception, United States officials may 
conduct “routine” searches and seizures of persons and property at the 
border without obtaining a warrant or establishing probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion.
64
 The border search exception applies to the 
international border and its “functional equivalent,”
65
 which includes 
ports of entry
66
 and international airports.
67
 It covers individuals and 
                                                     
60. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995). 
61. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 
62. See, e.g., Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–299 (1967) (stating that no 
search warrant is required under exigent circumstances if probable cause has been met: “The Fourth 
Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation [by obtaining 
a warrant] if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others”); Terry, 392 U.S. at 
27 (holding that an officer may search an individual for weapons based on reasonable suspicion 
even if the officer does not have probable cause or a warrant); United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 
U.S. 149, 152–53 (2004) (determining that the disassembly of vehicle gas tank at the border did not 
require reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or a warrant). 
63. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985); see also CLANCY, supra note 47, § 11.6.1.1, 
at 637–38. 
64. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985); see also CLANCY, supra 
note 47, § 10.2.2, at 491–97; 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.5(a) (5th ed. 2012 & Supp. 2014). The border search exception is an 
exception to the baseline warrant requirement, not the Fourth Amendment itself. See United States 
v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 621 (1977) (holding that the border search exception “is a longstanding, 
historically recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment’s general principle that a warrant be 
obtained”); United States v. Kim, No. 13-cr-00100-ABJ, 2015 BL 134375, at *22–23 (D.D.C May 
8, 2015), available at https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/kimruling.pdf (noting 
that the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement still applies to border searches). 
65. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973) (“Whatever the permissible 
scope of intrusiveness of a routine border search might be, searches of this kind may in certain 
circumstances take place not only at the border itself, but at its functional equivalents as well.”). 
66. See, e.g., United States v. Prince, 491 F.2d 655, 659 (5th Cir. 1974) (noting that the port 
where a ship docks after arriving from a foreign country is the “functional equivalent” of the border 
(citing Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 272–73)). 
67. See, e.g., United States v. Lawson, 461 F.3d 697, 700 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding Detroit 
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objects entering or exiting the United States,
68
 although courts have 
offered differing explanations for why the exception applies equally to 
entrance and exit searches.
69
 The historic justification for the border 
search exception has been the government’s right to exclude people or 
contraband from entering the country.
70
 This interest allows the 
government wide latitude to conduct searches that the Fourth 
Amendment would not allow in other contexts.
71
 
The Supreme Court has outlined the contours of the border search 
exception in three main cases: United States v. Ramsey,
72
 United States 
v. Montoya de Hernandez,
73
 and United States v. Flores-Montano.
74
 In 
Ramsey, the Court established that border searches of people and 
property generally do not require a warrant or probable cause.
75
 The 
                                                     
International Airport the “functional equivalent” of the border for flights arriving from foreign 
countries); United States v. Klein, 592 F.2d 909, 911 n.1 (5th Cir. 1979) (finding that an airport 
where an international flight lands qualifies as the “functional equivalent” of the border). Passengers 
on domestic flights are not searched pursuant to the border search exception. Rather, the 
administrative search exception—reserved for searches unrelated to law enforcement—is used to 
justify routine searches of individuals and their effects on domestic flights. See United States v. 
Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908–12 (9th Cir. 1973). 
68. See, e.g., United States v. Berisha, 925 F.2d 791, 795 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that routine 
stops and searches for currency of travelers exiting the United States fall within the border search 
exception). 
69. Larry Cunningham, The Border Search Exception as Applied to Exit and Export Searches: A 
Global Conceptualization, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 15–29, app. at 40–55 (2007). 
70. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM Film (12 200-Ft. Reels of Film), 413 U.S. 
123, 125 (1973) (“The Constitution gives Congress broad, comprehensive powers ‘[t]o regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations.’ Historically such broad powers have been necessary to prevent 
smuggling and to prevent prohibited articles from entry.” (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3)). 
71. See id. (“Import restrictions and searches of persons or packages at the national borders rest 
on different considerations and different rules of constitutional law from domestic regulations.”); 
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153–54 (1925) (“Travelers may be so stopped in crossing an 
international boundary because of national self protection reasonably requiring one entering the 
country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be 
lawfully brought in.”). The first Congress granted customs officials “full power and authority” to 
search ships entering United States ports without a warrant if officials had “reason to suspect any 
goods, ware or merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed.” Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§ 23–
24, 1 Stat. 29, 43. Courts have interpreted the “reason to suspect” language of the statute as 
requiring the same standard as “reasonable suspicion.” See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 
606, 612–13 (1977) (“The ‘reasonable cause to suspect’ test adopted by the [current] statute 
[derived from the 1789 Act] is, we think, a practical test which imposes a less stringent requirement 
than that of ‘probable cause’ imposed by the Fourth Amendment as a requirement for the issuance 
of warrants.” (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8 (1968))). 
72. 431 U.S. 606 (1977). 
73. 473 U.S. 531 (1985). 
74. 541 U.S. 149 (2004). 
75. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619. The Court mentioned the border search exception in dicta in earlier 
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Court upheld a customs official’s search of several envelopes mailed 
from Thailand to the United States.
76
 The officer had reasonable 
suspicion that the envelopes contained merchandise or contraband other 
than mere correspondence, and discovered heroin.
77
 The Court declined 
to require a warrant or probable cause for the search in light of the 
government’s heightened interests in prohibiting contraband from 
entering the country.
78
 The Court explained that border searches “are 
reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border,” 
reflecting the “long-standing right of the sovereign to protect itself by 




Despite this somewhat sweeping language, Ramsey did not establish 
that government officials may conduct any kind of border search without 
suspicion of criminal activity.
80
 Rather, the Court found that the customs 
agent had reasonable suspicion of a violation of customs law; the Court 
did not need to decide whether the Fourth Amendment would allow a 
suspicionless search of an envelope.
81
 The Court concluded it would 
make little sense to carve out special protection for envelopes that enter 
the United States by mail when, as the petitioner conceded, officials 
could warrantlessly search the same envelopes if a traveler physically 
carried them into the country.
82
  
Perhaps most important, nothing in Ramsey suggests border agents 
may search or read the content of correspondence without a warrant. The 
                                                     
decisions but did not expressly rule on it until Ramsey. See 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. at 
125; Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973); United States v. Thirty-Seven 
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971); Carroll, 267 U.S. at 154 (“Travelers may be so stopped in 
crossing an international boundary because of national self-protection reasonably requiring one 
entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which 
may be lawfully brought in.”); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886). 
76. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 607–08. 
77. Id. at 609. 
78. Id. at 619. 
79. Id. at 620 (“The border-search exception is grounded in the recognized right of the sovereign 
to control, subject to substantive limitations imposed by the Constitution, who and what may enter 
the country.”); see also Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. at 376 (noting that the border search “is 
an old practice and is intimately associated with excluding illegal articles from the country”). 
80. See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 625 (Powell, J., concurring). 
81. Id. at 614 (majority opinion). The Court found that reasonable suspicion of a customs 
violation had been established on the following facts: the envelopes were “bulky” and weighed 
“three to six times the normal weight of an airmail letter”; they were from Thailand, “a known 
source of narcotics”; they bore addresses of four different locations, apparently typed with the same 
typewriter; and, from physical touch, they felt like they contained more than “just plain paper.” Id. 
at 609. 
82. Id. at 620. 
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Court emphasized that “[a]pplicable postal regulations flatly prohibit, 
under all circumstances, the reading of correspondence absent a search 
warrant,” and rejected the dissent’s concerns about chilled speech on 
that basis.
83
 Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion to underscore
 
 his 
belief that those limits were sufficient to protect the First and Fourth 
Amendment rights at stake in the border context.
84
  
The rule under Ramsey is that officials may conduct routine border 
searches without a warrant or probable cause when those searches are 
tethered to the government’s interest in examining persons and property 
seeking entrance to the United States.
85
 The Court did not sanction 
suspicionless searches of mailed correspondence.
86
 The Court also 
expressly reserved the question of “whether, and under what 
circumstances, a border search might be deemed ‘unreasonable’ because 
of the particularly offensive manner in which it is carried out.”
87
 
C. “Routine” and “Nonroutine” Border Searches 
The Supreme Court distinguished between “routine” and 
“nonroutine” border searches and seizures in United States v. Montoya 
de Hernandez.
88
 The Court explained that, under Ramsey, “[r]outine 
searches of the persons and effects of entrants are not subject to any 
requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant,”
89
 but 
that the Court had “not previously decided what level of suspicion would 




Customs officials detained Montoya de Hernandez, who was traveling 
on a direct flight from Bogota, Colombia, to Los Angeles, California on 
suspicion that she was smuggling drugs—specifically, that she had 
swallowed balloons of cocaine.
91
 The facts of the case “clearly 
supported” the customs agents’ reasonable suspicion that Montoya de 
Hernandez was a cocaine smuggler.
92
 Montoya de Hernandez claimed 
                                                     
83. Id. at 623. 
84. See id. at 625 (Powell, J., concurring). 
85. Id. at 616 (majority opinion). 
86. Id. at 623. 
87. Id. at 618 n.13. 
88. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985). 
89. Id. at 538. 
90. Id. at 540. 
91. Id. at 532–36. 
92. Id. at 542. She had made eight recent trips to Miami and Los Angeles, but had no family or 
friends in the United States and no hotel reservations, despite arriving shortly after midnight. She 
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she was pregnant and agreed to take a pregnancy test.
93
 She declined to 
be x-rayed, and the customs inspectors informed her that they would 
detain her until she either agreed to an x-ray or produced a monitored 
bowel movement that would confirm or deny their suspicions.
94
 After 
sixteen hours of detention, border officials obtained a court order to 
conduct a rectal examination, which produced balloons of cocaine.
95
 
The Court held that the customs officials’ reasonable suspicion that 
Montoya de Hernandez was smuggling drugs in her alimentary canal 
was sufficient to justify her temporary detention.
96
 The Court explained 
that the reasonable suspicion standard “fits well into the situations 
involving alimentary canal smuggling at the border,” where the 
government has significant interests in preventing drug smuggling but 
would “rarely possess probable cause,” at least in part because this kind 
of smuggling “gives no external signs.”
97
 The standard “effects a needed 
balance between private and public interests when law enforcement 
officials must make a limited intrusion on less than probable cause.”
98
 
As in Ramsey, the Court characterized the government’s interests at 
the border in broad terms, noting that customs and immigration officials 
are charged with protecting the country from individuals who would 
bring in anything harmful, whether in the form of disease or 
contraband.
99
 But the Court’s holding was narrow and limited in 
important respects.
100
 First, the Court reiterated that a border search must 
be “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified it 
initially.”
101
 Second, the Court found that reasonable suspicion justified 
                                                     
was carrying $5000 in cash, mostly in $50 bills, but had no billfold; although she claimed she was 
planning to purchase merchandise for her husband’s store, she had no appointments with vendors. 
She could not recall how she purchased her airline ticket. A female customs inspector conducted a 
pat down and strip search in a private area, finding that Montoya de Hernandez was wearing two 
pairs of underwear and a paper towel lining her crotch. Id. at 533–34. 
93. Id. at 534. 
94. Id. at 534–35. 
95. Id. at 535–36. Over four days, Montoya de Hernandez eventually passed eighty-eight balloons 
containing 528 grams of cocaine. Id. at 536. 
96. Id. at 541. 
97. Id.  
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 544. 
100. Id. (“We hold that the detention of a traveler at the border, beyond the scope of a routine 
customs search and inspection, is justified at its inception if customs agents, considering all the facts 
surrounding the traveler and her trip, reasonably suspect that the traveler is smuggling contraband in 
her alimentary canal.”). 
101. Id. at 542. In assessing whether Montoya de Hernandez’s prolonged incommunicado 
detention was “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified it initially,” the 
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Montoya de Hernandez’s initial temporary detention, but not necessarily 
a body cavity search.
102
 Rather, the Court left open the possibility that a 
body cavity search would be so intrusive as to require evidence 
establishing reasonable suspicion or a higher standard, such as probable 
cause or a warrant.
103
 The Court noted: “[W]e suggest no view on what 
level of suspicion, if any, is required for nonroutine border searches such 
as strip, body cavity, or involuntary x-ray searches.”
104
 
The Supreme Court’s last major statement on border searches came in 
United States v. Flores-Montano,
105
 in which it held that a search 
involving the disassembly of an automobile gasoline tank did not require 
reasonable suspicion.
106
 The Court rejected arguments that the defendant 
had any privacy interest in his gas tank protected by the Fourth 
Amendment,
107
 or any right to prevent a potentially destructive search of 
the tank.
108
 The Court made it clear that the search of a gas tank was not 
the kind of “nonroutine” or highly intrusive search contemplated by 
Montoya de Hernandez.
109
 The Court explained: 
[T]he reasons that might support a requirement of some level of 
suspicion in the case of highly intrusive searches of the person—
dignity and privacy interests of the person being searched—
simply do not carry over to vehicles. Complex balancing tests to 
determine what is a “routine” search of a vehicle, as opposed to 




The Court qualified this statement by leaving open the possibility that a 
search could be “so destructive” of one’s property as to warrant similar 
                                                     
Court found it significant that Montoya de Hernandez refused to submit to an x-ray. Id. at 542–43. 
“Respondent alone was responsible for much of the duration and discomfort of the seizure.” Id. at 
543. 
102. Id. at 541 & n.4. 
103. Id. at 541.  
104. Id. at 541 n.4. The Ninth Circuit has held that reasonable suspicion is required for a strip 
search at the border. United States v. Chase, 503 F.2d 571, 574 (9th Cir. 1974). 
105. 541 U.S. 149 (2004). 
106. Id. at 155–56. 
107. Id. at 154 (“It is difficult to imagine how the search of a gas tank, which should be solely a 
repository for fuel, could be more of an invasion of privacy than the search of the automobile’s 
passenger compartment.”). 
108. Id. at 155–56. The Court left open the possibility that a search could be “so destructive” of 
one’s property as to warrant a requirement of reasonable suspicion: “While it may be true that some 
searches of property are so destructive as to require a different result, this was not one of them.” Id. 
109. Id. at 152. 
110. Id. 
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protection to that of an “intrusive” search of a person.
111
 
The sum of Ramsey, Montoya de Hernandez, and Flores-Montano 
leave government officials with relatively wide latitude to conduct 
routine border searches and seizures of persons and property without 
suspicion of wrongdoing.
112
 The government has significant interests in 
preventing the entrance of unwanted people and contraband, and 
individuals crossing the border have a reduced expectation of privacy in 
their person and effects.
113
 Nevertheless, the Court has insisted that the 
Fourth Amendment applies to border searches. It has also indicated that 
searches that are particularly destructive to property or highly intrusive 
to a person likely warrant a heightened standard, and reserved the 
question as to whether such searches would require reasonable 
suspicion, probable cause, or a warrant.
114
 
One lingering issue is the distinction between “routine” and 
“nonroutine” border searches. The Court has yet to define what searches 
would be “nonroutine,” or what level of process it would impose for 
such searches.
115
 Nevertheless, lower federal courts have found the 
“intrusiveness” of the search—the extent to which the search invades an 
individual’s privacy—is what distinguishes a “routine” from a 
“nonroutine” border search.
116
 Courts have considered personal searches 
that involve “some level of indignity or intrusiveness,” but fall short of a 
                                                     
111. Id. at 155–56. Before Flores-Montano, federal circuit courts defined destructive property 
searches, including drilling into a vehicle or package, as nonroutine border searches requiring 
reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., United States v. Rivas, 157 F.3d 364, 367 (5th Cir. 1998) (drilling 
into the body of a trailer); United States v. Robles, 45 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1995) (drilling into a metal 
cylinder in a wooden crate); United States v. Carreon, 872 F.2d 1436, 1440 (10th Cir. 1989) 
(holding reasonable suspicion justified extension of routine vehicle search to include drilling a hole 
in a camper wall). After Flores-Montano, courts have been more reluctant to scrutinize such 
property searches. E.g., United States v. Cortez-Rocha, 394 F.3d 1115, 1125 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting 
that cutting open spare tire in context of border search did not require reasonable suspicion). 
112. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985) (“Routine searches of the 
persons and effects of entrants are not subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable 
cause, or warrant, and first-class mail may be opened without a warrant on less than probable 
cause.” (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)). 
113. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 154 (“[O]n many occasions, we have noted that the expectation 
of privacy is less at the border than it is in the interior.”).  
114. Id. at 155–56. 
115. See, e.g., United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The Court has 
never defined the precise dimensions of a reasonable border search, instead pointing to the necessity 
of a case-by-case analysis.”). 
116. See United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he level of intrusion into 
a person’s privacy is what determines whether a border search is routine.”). But see United States v. 
Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1346 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that the “personal indignity suffered by 
the individual searched controls the level of suspicion required to make the search reasonable”). 
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strip or cavity search, to be routine.
117
 The First Circuit has listed a 




On this distinction, lower courts have found searches of an 
individual’s outer clothing, personal effects, purse, and wallet
119
 all to be 
routine in the border context. As one federal district court explained, 
“pat-downs, pocket-dumps, and even searches that require moving or 
adjusting clothing without disrobing, and also may include scanning, 
opening, and rifling through the contents of bags or other closed 
containers” are all routine kinds of searches.
120
 Examples of nonroutine 







 and removal of an artificial 
limb.
124
 In practice, at least in reported cases, the government has 
demonstrated significant evidence before conducting such intrusive body 
searches: “It is fair to say that most of the reported cases upholding body 
cavity border searches have in fact involved rather strong evidence that 
smuggled goods were being carried in a body cavity.”
125
 
                                                     
117. United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 549 (D. Md. 2014).  
118. United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512 (1st Cir. 1988). Factors include: 
(i) whether the search results in the exposure of intimate body parts or requires the suspect to 
disrobe; 
(ii) whether physical contact between Customs officials and the suspect occurs during the 
search; 
(iii) whether force is used to effect the search; 
(iv) whether the type of search exposes the suspect to pain or danger; 
(v) the overall manner in which the search is conducted; and 
(vi) whether the suspect’s reasonable expectations of privacy, if any, are abrogated by the 
search. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
119. United States v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 1287, 1291–92 (7th Cir. 1993). 
120.  Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 549. 
121. United States v. Adekunle, 980 F.2d 985, 987–88 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Asbury, 
586 F.2d 973, 975–76 (2d Cir. 1978); Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 
1967); see also United States v. Palmer, 575 F.2d 721, 723 (9th Cir. 1978) (requiring a woman to 
“lift her dress so that [her] girdle could be observed”). 
122. See Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703, 710 (9th Cir. 1966).  
123. United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1349 (11th Cir. 1984). The Supreme Court and 
the Fourth Circuit have also assumed that an x-ray search is nonroutine. See United States v. 
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 n.4 (1985); United States v. Aguebor, No. 98-4258, 
1999 WL 5110 (4th Cir. Jan. 4, 1999). 
124. United States v. Sanders, 663 F.2d 1, 3 (2d Cir. 1981). 
125. LAFAVE, supra note 64, § 10.5(e), at 255. 
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II. DIGITAL BORDER SEARCHES 
ICE and CBP have authorized border officers to search, copy, and 
retain digital information contained on, or accessible through, electronic 
devices at the border without individualized suspicion of criminal 
activity.
126
 Defendants have challenged these searches as unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment. In particular, defendants have argued that 
digital border searches are nonroutine and require reasonable 
suspicion.
127
 This Part discusses major developments in the digital 
border search case law.  
Part II.A discusses the first wave of major federal appellate cases. 
Under the initial prevailing approach, courts generally treated computer 
searches as routine and not requiring reasonable suspicion.
128
 In two 
paradigmatic cases—the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. 
Ickes
129
 and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Arnold—
courts reached this conclusion by analogizing a search for digital 
information on a computer to a search for physical items held in a 
physical container, such as luggage or the glove compartment of a car.
130
  
Part II.B discusses a second major doctrinal development, where two 
federal courts have concluded that a “forensic” digital border search is 
nonroutine and requires reasonable suspicion.
131
 The Ninth Circuit, in 
United States v. Cotterman, and the District of Maryland, in United 
                                                     
126. ICE DIRECTIVE, supra note 2, § 6.1, at 2; CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 2, § 5.1.2, at 3. Both 
policies permit indefinite detention of data that pertains to immigration, customs, or other law 
enforcement matters. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 42, at 15; ICE DIRECTIVE, supra 
note 2, § 8.5(1), at 7; CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 2, § 5.4.1.2, at 7. The policies also permit 
retention of all devices and data for a reasonable time to conduct a thorough search. This is 
generally five days under the CBP policy and thirty days under the ICE policy, but both allow 
extensions of time with supervisory approval or extenuating circumstances. ICE DIRECTIVE, supra 
note 2, § 8.3(1), at 4–5; CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 2, § 5.3.1, at 4.  
127. See generally infra Part II.A–B. 
128. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the 
Fourth Amendment does not protect electronic devices, including computers and cell phones, from 
warrantless and suspicionless searches in border context); United States v. Linarez-Delgado, 259 F. 
App’x 506, 508 (3d Cir. 2007) (no reasonable suspicion required for a routine border search of 
“[d]ata storage media and electronic equipment, such as films, computer devices, and videotapes”); 
United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 504 (4th Cir. 2005) (no suspicion required for computer search 
at the border); Abidor v. Napolitano, 990 F. Supp. 2d 260, 277–78 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (dismissing the 
lawsuit for lack of standing, but nevertheless concluding that reasonable suspicion was not required 
for a laptop search); United States v. Bunty, 617 F. Supp. 2d 359, 365 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (no 
reasonable suspicion required to search through computer disks). 
129. 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2005). 
130. See infra notes 166–75 and accompanying text. 
131. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Saboonchi, 
990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 539 (D. Md. 2014). 
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States v. Saboonchi, moved away from the “container” analogy and 
recognized distinct Fourth Amendment interests implicated by extensive 
searches of digital information.
132
 Nevertheless, both courts agreed that 
border agents may conduct manual digital border searches of electronic 
devices without reasonable suspicion, thereby affirming a core holding 
common to Ickes and Arnold.
133
 
Courts have generally focused on whether reasonable suspicion is 
required for the search. In almost all cases federal courts have found that 
government agents had established reasonable suspicion.
134
 Some courts 
have reached the question of whether reasonable suspicion is required, 
even while finding that it has been met.
135
 Others have declined to reach 
the question either because they found that the search was routine
136
 or 
to avoid reaching a constitutional question that was not necessary for the 
disposition of the case.
137
 As a practical matter, the federal government 
has consistently argued that it does not need reasonable suspicion to 
conduct a digital border search, no matter how intrusive.
138
 
                                                     
132. See infra Part II.B. 
133. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 966–67; Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 546. 
134. See Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 970 (border agents had reasonable suspicion); United States v. 
Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 503–05 (4th Cir. 2005) (suggesting that reasonable suspicion had been met but 
nevertheless holding that no suspicion was required); United States v. Roberts, 274 F.3d 1007, 1014 
(5th Cir. 2001) (customs agents had reasonable suspicion); United States v Hassanshahi, 75 F. Supp. 
3d 101, 119 (D.D.C. 2014) (same); Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 571 (same); Abidor v. 
Napolitano, 990 F. Supp. 2d 260, 282 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding reasonable suspicion). But see 
United States v. Stewart, 729 F.3d 517, 524 (6th Cir. 2013) (initial computer search was routine, not 
requiring reasonable suspicion). 
135. See Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 968 (reasonable suspicion satisfied); Abidor, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 
282 (same). 
136. See United States v. Linarez-Delgado, 259 F. App’x 506, 508 (3d Cir. 2007). Courts have 
also considered arguments that conducting a computer search away from the border is an “extended 
border search”—a search that occurs after an individual has been cleared for entry and regained a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. Extended border searches require reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity. But, where a computer has not been cleared for entry, as in most cases, courts 
have rejected arguments that a subsequent offsite search is an extended border search. E.g., Stewart, 
729 F.3d at 524–26 (sending laptop off site to conduct a search, but not a forensic examination, was 
a continuation of a routine border search and not an extended border search requiring reasonable 
suspicion).  
137. See United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding reasonable suspicion 
met and declining to determine whether search of computer diskettes and undeveloped film required 
reasonable suspicion); Hassanshahi, 75 F. Supp. 3d at 119. 
138. See, e.g., Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 959 (“[H]aving failed to obtain a favorable ruling on that 
ground, the government did not challenge on appeal the conclusion that there was no reasonable 
suspicion. Rather, it sought a broad ruling that no suspicion of any kind was required.”); United 
States v. Kim, No. 13-cr-00100-ABJ, 2015 BL 134375, at *1 (D.D.C. May 8, 2015), available at 
https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/kimruling.pdf; see also Saboonchi, 990 F. 
Supp. 2d at 540 (government arguing forensic digital border search was routine). 
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At the outset, it is useful to note that border searches of electronic 
devices can take at least three forms. This Comment draws descriptive 
categories based on examples from DHS policies and case law: (1) a 
physical device search (which is not the primary subject of this 
Comment) and two kinds of digital searches, (2) a manual digital search 
and (3) a forensic digital search. Border officials may digitally search a 
wide range of devices: “any devices that may contain information, such 
as computers, disks, drives, tapes, mobile phones and other 
communication devices, cameras, music and other media players, and 
any other electronic or digital devices.”
139
 
In a physical device search, a border officer examines physical 
aspects of the device, not the information stored on it.
140
 For example, 
the agent might ask an individual to turn on a cell phone, camera, or 
computer to confirm that the device is what it appears to be.
141
 This may 
also involve physically opening the device to determine whether it 
contains anything out of the ordinary.
142
 In any case, the agent does not 
examine data stored on or accessed via the device, and the overall 
purpose of the search is to find physical evidence that may be contained 
inside the device or confirm that the device is what it appears to be. 
In a manual digital search, an officer searches digital information 
contained on or accessible through the device.
143
 This could be a 
relatively superficial search—scrolling through contacts or recent calls 
on a smartphone, or opening up a desktop folder to browse the names of 
files.
144
 But it could also include a relatively extensive examination of 
digital information, depending in large part on how much time the 
officer has to search.
145
 
                                                     
139. CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 2, § 3.2, at 2. 
140. See id. § 3.4, at 2 (distinguishing between searches for digital information and turning a 
device on or determining whether a device contains physical contraband). 
141. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008) (CBP officer 
“instructed Arnold to turn on the computer so she could see if it was functioning”). 
142. See, e.g., United States v. Molina–Gómez, 781 F.3d 13, 17 (1st Cir. 2015) (discussing a 
search where a border official disassembled laptop computer and Playstation and discovered black 
bags containing heroin hidden inside); Abidor, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 268 (Abidor alleged that his 
laptop and external hard drive had been physically opened in addition to being searched). 
143. See, e.g., Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1005 (“When the computer had booted up, its desktop 
displayed numerous icons and folders. Two folders were entitled ‘Kodak Pictures’ and one was 
entitled ‘Kodak Memories.’ [CBP officers] Peng and Roberts clicked on the Kodak folders, opened 
the files, and viewed the photos on Arnold’s computer including one that depicted two nude 
women.”). 
144. See id. 
145. For example, in Arnold, after the initial search turned up suspicious images, border officers 
detained Arnold for several hours and thoroughly searched his computer. Id. In United States v. 
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Finally, a forensic digital search is similar to a digital border search in 
that the goal is to identify information stored on the device, but it has 
several distinct technical aspects that make it potentially more 
exhaustive.
146
 In most cases, an officer first confiscates the electronic 
device. A computer expert then makes an exact copy of the device’s 
hard drive and uses sophisticated software to exhaustively search all data 
on the device, including ostensibly deleted files.
147
 The search can take 
days, weeks, or months, depending on the amount of data.
148
 
It is relatively easy to distinguish between a physical device search 
and either kind of digital search. The physical search examines only 
physical aspects of the device, whereas a digital search is a search of, 
and for, information. It is more difficult to differentiate a manual digital 
search from a forensic digital search, because both involve informational 
searches, but courts have generally looked to the method of the search to 
draw the distinction. For example, in United States v. Saboonchi, the 
court identified three aspects of the process that make a search 
“forensic.”
149
 These aspects include creating an exact copy of the 
                                                     
Kim, No. 13-cr-00100-ABJ, 2015 BL 134375, at *19–20 (D.D.C. May 8, 2015), available at 
https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/kimruling.pdf, the government argued that 
the search at issue was not “forensic” because a person with unlimited time could locate the same 
documents. See also United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 547 (D. Md. 2014) 
(acknowledging that digital border searches that are not “forensic” may nevertheless be “deeply 
probing and . . . invasive”). 
146. See Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 537–47 
(2005) (discussing technical details and practices involved in computer forensics). 
147. E.g., United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2013). In Cotterman: 
 The agents . . . retained the Cottermans’ laptops and a digital camera. Agent Brisbine drove 
almost 170 miles . . . to the ICE office in Tucson, Arizona, where he delivered both laptops and 
one of the three digital cameras to ICE Senior Special Agent & Computer Forensic Examiner 
John Owen. Agent Owen began his examination on Saturday, the following day. He used a 
forensic program to copy the hard drives of the electronic devices. . . . Agent Owen then used 
forensic software that often must run for several hours to examine copies of the laptop hard 
drives. He began his personal examination of the laptops on Sunday. That evening, Agent 
Owen found seventy-five images of child pornography within the unallocated space of 
Cotterman’s laptop. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). “[U]nallocated space” contains deleted data that has yet to be overwritten 
with new data and can only be accessed with forensic software. Id.  
148. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 561 (“In a forensic search of electronic storage, a bitstream 
copy is created and then is searched by an expert using highly specialized analytical software—
often over the course of several days, weeks, or months—to locate specific files or file types, 
recover hidden, deleted, or encrypted data, and analyze the structure of files and of a drive.”); Kim, 
2015 BL 134375, at *15 (DHS special agent stated in affidavit that the “identification and extraction 
process . . . may take weeks or months” (alteration in original)); Kerr, supra note 146, at 544 
(“[T]he analyst may spend several weeks or even months analyzing a single hard drive.”). 
149. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d, at 564. 
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 using software that provides access to all 
information on a device, including previously deleted files;
151
 and using 
software that provides access to location information and other 
“metadata.”
152
 But even if courts can distinguish between manual and 
forensic digital searches based on technical attributes, the amount and 
kind of information that each search can reveal may be more dependent 




A. Digital Border Search 1.0: Digital Border Searches Are Routine 
and Do Not Require Reasonable Suspicion 
Two federal appellate decisions illustrate the first major doctrinal 
development with respect to digital border searches: the Fourth Circuit’s 
decision in United States v. Ickes and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
United States v. Arnold. 
In Ickes, the Fourth Circuit held that a manual digital border search of 
Ickes’s computer was routine and that border agents did not have to 
establish any level of suspicion before executing it.
154
 The court treated 
computer files as indistinguishable from any other “cargo” subject to 
routine search and inspection at the border.
155
 The court rejected Ickes’s 
argument that the First Amendment granted special protection to digital 
information because it is expressive.
156
 Such logic “would create a 
sanctuary at the border for all expressive material—even for terrorist 
plans.”
157
 The court also expressed skepticism that its decision would 
result in widespread suspicionless digital searches because “[c]ustoms 




Although it declined to do so, the Ickes court likely could have found 
that border officials satisfied reasonable suspicion for the search of his 
computer.
159
 The court acknowledged that Ickes raised suspicion through 
                                                     
150. Id. at 564–66. 
151. Id. at 566–68. 
152. Id. at 568–69. 
153. See Kim, 2015 BL 134375, at *19–20. 
154. United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 505–06 (2005). 
155. Id. at 504. 
156. Id. at 506. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 506–07. 
159. See United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 546 (D. Md. 2014) (noting that the 
officers in Ickes “likely had reasonable suspicion before they viewed the contents of the disks”). 
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his conduct and possessions, which “suggest[ed] the need to search 
further,” but nevertheless explained that no suspicion was required for 
the search.
160
 Deference to the discretion of border officials, the court 
said, is the “essence” of the border search exception, which requires 
“reliance upon the trained observations and judgments of customs 




In Arnold, the Ninth Circuit also held that digital border searches do 
not require reasonable suspicion.
162
 Arnold was stopped at customs at 
Los Angeles International Airport after a trip to the Philippines.
163
 
Border officials asked Arnold to turn on his computer and briefly 
examined two desktop folders labeled “Kodak Pictures” and “Kodak 
Memories,” one of which revealed a photo of nude women.
164
 The 
border agent called in supervisors who searched his laptop further over 




As in Ickes, the court premised its holding on the concept that a 
search of a computer is no different than a search of any other item of 
personal property.
166
 The court found that Arnold “failed to distinguish 
how the search of his laptop and its electronic contents is logically any 
different from the suspicionless border searches of travelers’ luggage 
that the Supreme Court and we have allowed.”
167
 The court also 
                                                     
Ickes was traveling into the United States from Canada. He told the first border agent that he was on 
vacation, but his van appeared to hold everything he owned, so a second agent began a cursory 
inspection. The second agent found a video camera, which contained coverage of a tennis match 
that focused “excessively on a young ball boy.” Ickes, 393 F.3d at 502. The agents searched the van 
and found marijuana seeds and pipes and a copy of a warrant for Ickes’s arrest, as well as a 
computer and several albums containing what appeared to be child pornography. Id. at 503. 
160. Ickes, 393 F.3d at 507. 
161. Id. In other cases where law enforcement possessed reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 
prior to a digital border search, courts have generally declined to decide whether the Fourth 
Amendment permits a suspicionless digital border search.  See, e.g., United States v. Irving, 452 
F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2006) (“A border search is valid under the Fourth Amendment, even if non-
routine, if it is supported by reasonable suspicion.”); see also United States v. Roberts, 274 F.3d 
1007, 1014 (5th Cir. 2001) (assuming, but not deciding, that a search of a laptop and computer disks 
is nonroutine, and expressly avoiding the question in order to decide a constitutional question on the 
narrowest grounds possible). 
162. United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008). 
163. Id. at 1005. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 1008. 
167. Id. at 1009. The court reasoned that, for border searches, “the Supreme Court has refused to 
draw distinctions between containers of information and contraband with respect to their quality or 
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interpreted Flores-Montano to create a categorical rule for border 
searches of physical property, including laptops.
168
 Under this reading, 
border searches of any item of personal property do not implicate 
privacy or dignity interests.
169
 
Concluding that computers are no different from other personal 
property allowed the court to draw two other conclusions. First, the court 
compared Arnold’s laptop to the gas tank of the car in Flores-
Montano,
170
 where the Supreme Court held that dismantling a gas tank 
did not require reasonable suspicion but suggested that a particularly 
destructive search of personal property might.
171
 Similarly, the Ninth 
Circuit reasoned that the search of Arnold’s computer would have to 
have caused significant physical damage to the computer to trigger the 




Second, the court analogized the search of the digital information on 
Arnold’s computer to a search of physical items in a closed container 
such as luggage or a purse or wallet.
173
 The court cited California v. 
Acevedo,
174
 where the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment 
permits police to “look[] inside a closed container” when already 
properly searching a car.
175
 The Ninth Circuit concluded that searching a 
laptop was akin to searching a container and could not be “particularly 
offensive” to Arnold simply because it could reveal far more information 
than a search of virtually any other physical container.
176
 
                                                     
nature for purposes of determining the appropriate level of Fourth Amendment protection.” Id. DHS 
has analogized computers and cell phones to physical containers. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., supra note 42, at 6 (“[Electronic] devices are one of many types of items or 
containers that may be searched, usually during secondary inspection.”). 
168. Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1008 (“The Supreme Court’s analysis [in Flores-Montano] determining 
what protection to give a vehicle was not based on the unique characteristics of vehicles with 
respect to other property, but was based on the fact that a vehicle, as a piece of property, simply 
does not implicate the same ‘dignity and privacy’ concerns as ‘highly intrusive searches of the 
person.’” (quoting United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004))). 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 1008–09.  
171. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155–56. 
172. Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1009. 
173. Id. at 1009–10. 
174. 500 U.S. 565 (1991). 
175. Id. at 576. 
176. Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1009–10. The court also rejected Arnold’s argument that a search of a 
laptop was analogous to a search of a home because of a laptop’s storage capacity. Id. 
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B.  Digital Border Search 2.0: Forensic Digital Border Searches of 
Electronic Devices Are Nonroutine and Require Reasonable 
Suspicion 
The principles behind Arnold and Ickes have come under challenge, 
particularly in cases involving forensic digital searches at the border. 
Two recent cases—United States v. Cotterman and United States v. 
Saboonchi—show the emergence of a new and competing doctrine on 
digital border searches that embraces parts of Arnold and Ickes while 
repudiating others. 
1. United States v. Cotterman 
In Cotterman, the Ninth Circuit held that a forensic digital border 
search is nonroutine and requires reasonable suspicion.
177
 Sitting en 
banc, the court concluded that “the comprehensive and intrusive nature 
of a forensic examination . . . trigger[s] the requirement of reasonable 
suspicion.”
178
 The majority explained that the “painstaking analysis” 
involved in the forensic examination, which included copying and 
searching Cotterman’s hard drive in its entirety, including ostensibly 
deleted files, “is akin to reading a diary line by line looking for mention 




The court emphasized how the technological capabilities of modern 
                                                     
177. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 968 (9th Cir. 2013). 
178. Id. at 962. The district court found that the border agents failed to establish reasonable 
suspicion and granted Cotterman’s motion to suppress. Id. at 959. The Ninth Circuit found that 
border officials had reasonable suspicion and reversed. Id. at 957. The Ninth Circuit’s reversal of 
that finding was based on five factors. First, Cotterman and his wife were returning from Mexico, “a 
country associated with sex tourism.” Id. at 968–69. Second, at primary inspection the Treasury 
Enforcement Communication System (TECS), a database used by DHS to track individuals 
suspected of criminal activity, indicated that Cotterman was convicted of child molestation in 1992 
and may be involved in child sex tourism. Id. at 957. Third, Cotterman and his wife were carrying a 
variety of electronic equipment: two computers and three digital cameras. Id. Fourth, Cotterman 
traveled frequently. Id. at 969. Fifth, Cotterman protected certain files with password protection, 
which could be used to further the possession of child pornography. Id. Judge Milan Smith, writing 
in dissent, criticized the majority for finding reasonable suspicion on these “weak facts,” which he 
found fell “woefully short.” Id. at 982, 990–94 (Smith, J., dissenting). At least one other court has 
questioned whether being on the TECS list itself supports a finding of reasonable suspicion for a 
search. See United States v. Laich, No. 08-20089, 2010 WL 259041, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 20, 
2010) (finding the fact that Laich was on the TECS list “unpersuasive, in that the Government has 
not provided the Court with any insight into the overall nature of the TECS list, the standards, if 
any, that were used to determine an individual’s placement on this list, or the significance, if any, of 
being designated as one for whom officials should ‘lookout’”). 
179. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 962–63. 
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cell phones and laptops make a forensic digital search especially 
intrusive—and analytically distinct from searches of other forms of 
property.
180
 A forensic search provides law enforcement with access to a 
traveler’s information in ways that are quantitatively and qualitatively 
different from routine border searches of physical belongings.
181
 Modern 
electronic devices are capable of storing “warehouses full of 
information”—far more information about an individual than a person 
could physically travel with.
182
 Moreover, electronic devices are not 
simply repositories for files that individuals routinely carry. Rather, they 
are “simultaneously offices and personal diaries” that “contain the most 
intimate details of our lives: financial records, confidential business 
documents, medical records and private emails.”
183
 
In a rejection of the logic of its earlier decision in Arnold, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the characteristics of a forensic digital search 
implicate important privacy and dignity interests protected by the Fourth 
Amendment because of the “uniquely sensitive nature of data on 
electronic devices.”
184
 The possibility of intruding upon these privacy 
and dignity interests is what distinguishes a forensic digital search from 
other kinds of property searches at the border such as disassembling a 
gas tank, as in Flores-Montano,
185
 or drilling a hole in the bed of a 
pickup truck
186
—searches that have “little implication for an individual’s 
dignity and privacy interests.”
187
 The court repudiated Arnold’s 
categorical approach to property searches, finding instead that what is 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment “must account for differences 
in property.”
188
 That analysis must recognize that individuals and society 
have different expectations of privacy with respect to different kinds of 
property. While travelers expect searches of physical property at the 
border, they do not expect border agents to “mine every last piece of 
                                                     
180. Id. at 965 (“The point is technology matters.”). 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 964. 
183. Id.  
184. Id. at 966 (finding that a forensic digital search is “essentially a computer strip search. An 
exhaustive forensic search of a copied laptop hard drive intrudes upon privacy and dignity interests 
to a far greater degree than a cursory search at the border”); cf. supra notes 166–76 and 
accompanying text (describing the reasoning in Arnold). 
185. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 150–51 (2004).  
186. See United States v. Chaudhry, 424 F.3d 1051, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005). 
187. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 966 (“[T]he uniquely sensitive nature of data on electronic devices 
carries with it a significant expectation of privacy and thus renders an exhaustive exploratory search 
more intrusive than with other forms of property.”). 
188. Id. 
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data on their devices or deprive them of their most personal property for 
days” absent some particularized suspicion.
189
 
The court recognized the government’s substantial interest in 
protecting the country from contraband, an interest that “may be 
heightened” by national crises such as drug smuggling or international 
terrorism.
190
 But the court emphasized that “reasonableness remains the 
touchstone” of the Fourth Amendment, even at the border, and cautioned 
that the Supreme Court “has never endorsed the proposition that the goal 
of deterring illegal contraband at the border suffices to justify any 
manner of intrusive search.”
191
  
The majority defended the reasonable suspicion requirement as a 
“modest, workable standard” that law enforcement officials already 
apply in other contexts.
192
 Responding to the dissent,
193
 the majority 
reasoned that the practical considerations of border control—in 
particular, the “sheer number of international travelers”—are such that, 
“as a matter of commonsense and resources, it is only when reasonable 
suspicion is aroused that such searches typically take place.”
194
 The 
court concluded that the substantial privacy and dignity interests people 
have in digital information outweigh the government’s interests in 
conducting a forensic digital border search without any suspicion.
195
 
The Cotterman majority distinguished a forensic search from other 
digital border searches that it considered routine but failed to elaborate 
on the distinction.
196
 For example, whereas the First Circuit created a list 
of factors for determining whether a particular search at the border was 
routine or nonroutine, the Ninth Circuit created no such framework for 
defining a forensic digital search in contrast to a manual one.
197
 Instead, 
the Ninth Circuit largely left the details to law enforcement to “make a 
                                                     
189. Id. at 967–68 (internal citation omitted). 
190. Id. at 966 (internal quotations omitted). 
191. Id. at 967. 
192. Id. at 966. 
193. See id. at 985 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
194. Id. at 967 n.14 (majority opinion). 
195. Id. at 967–68. 
196. Lower courts have had difficulty applying the distinction. See United States v. Kim, No. 13-
cr-00100-ABJ, 2015 BL 134375, at *19–21 (D.D.C. May 8, 2015), available at 
https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/kimruling.pdf; United States v. Saboonchi, 
990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 552–58 (D. Md. 2014) (“[I]it is difficult to figure out the precise basis on 
which the Ninth Circuit distinguished forensic searches from conventional ones.”). 
197. Compare Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 967, with United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 511–12 
(1st Cir. 1988) (listing factors for determining whether a particular body search at the border is 
routine or nonroutine). 
17 - Miller.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/21/2015  8:10 PM 
2015] DIGITAL BORDER SEARCHES AFTER RILEY 1971 
 
commonsense differentiation between a manual review of files on an 




The court did state that the search in Arnold was permissible without 
reasonable suspicion, even while narrowing Arnold to its facts.
199
 The 
court characterized the search in Arnold as a “quick look and unintrusive 
search.”
200
 Although the search in Arnold began as a brief look into two 
desktop folders, it ultimately lasted several hours.
201
 As the Saboonchi 
court noted, the complete search in Arnold “hardly is ‘quick’ in the 
conventional sense and, to the contrary, actually shows how lengthy and 
comprehensive a conventional search can be.”
202
 The Cotterman 
majority’s abbreviated discussion of the differences between forensic 
and manual digital searches and its approval of the digital search in 
Arnold illustrate the challenges of drawing a clear line between digital 
searches that are so intrusive as to require reasonable suspicion—or 
some higher standard—and those that do not. 
2. United States v. Saboonchi 
In United States v. Saboonchi, border agents confiscated and 
forensically searched two smartphones and a flash drive after stopping 
Ali Saboonchi and his wife, who were returning to New York after a day 
trip to Canada.
203
 The government argued that the searches were routine 
                                                     
198. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 967. 
199. Id. at 960, 960 n.6. 
200. Id. at 960. 
201. United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008). The district court found that 
the border agents had not established reasonable suspicion before conducting the search. Id. 
202. United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 555 (D. Md. 2014). Saboonchi read 
Cotterman’s interpretation of Arnold broadly, to include the full search that took place. But there is 
a narrower reading as well. In Cotterman, the Ninth Circuit may have meant to include only the 
initial search of Arnold, which turned up the first photo, within its definition of a “quick . . . and 
unintrusive” digital search, given the fact that the initial search aroused enough suspicion that the 
border agents decided to dig further. For example, later in the opinion the majority emphasized that 
“suspicionless searches of the type approved in Arnold will continue; border officials will conduct 
further, forensic examinations where their suspicions are aroused by what they find or by other 
factors.” Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 967. The court also contrasted a forensic search with a “cursory” 
search of a computer at the border. Id. at 966. In any case, the Ninth Circuit was not particularly 
clear on whether there are any limits for a nonforensic digital search at the border.  
203. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 539. The agents stopped Saboonchi and his wife for 
secondary questioning after Saboonchi turned up a hit on the Treasury Enforcement Communication 
System (TECS). Id. at 541. DHS had flagged Saboonchi, who is a dual citizen of the United States 
and Iran, in connection with suspicion that he may be violating restrictions on export to Iran. Id. at 
539. The agents questioned Saboonchi and his wife separately and seized two smartphones and a 
flash drive. Id. The couple was then allowed to reenter the United States. Id. A DHS special agent 
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and therefore subject to no reasonable suspicion requirement under 
Ickes.
204
 The court agreed that, under Ickes, “the mere fact that a search 
includes computer files does not transform it from routine to 
nonroutine.”
205
 Nevertheless, the court distinguished Ickes on the 
grounds that it did not address forensic digital searches.
206
 It concluded 
that such searches are “sui generis” and require reasonable suspicion.
207
 
The court reached the same result as the Ninth Circuit in Cotterman 
but went much further in its analysis as to why forensic searches are 
uniquely intrusive. The court identified three factors that differentiate 
forensic digital searches from other digital searches.
208
 First, because a 
forensic search requires making an exact copy of the electronic device’s 
hard drive, it does not present the same time constraints and allows 
border agents to complete the search long after the individual has left the 
border.
209
 A forensic search allows for an exhaustive search of all 
information on the device in a way that a manual search of a computer in 
the border context would be unable to replicate.
210
 Even a lengthy 
seizure may raise questions if it is not “reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified it initially.”
211
 
Second, the use of specialized software in a forensic search provides 
access to previously deleted information and unsaved data.
212
 This limits 
the traveler’s ability to choose what to travel with.
213
 In a world of 
suspicionless forensic digital searches, a traveler who wishes to maintain 
private or confidential records “would be well advised never to put 
private or personal data on her computer or smartphone.”
214
 It is this 
                                                     
subsequently conducted a forensic search of the smartphones and flash drive. Id. at 539–40. 
204. Id. at 544, 546. 
205. Id. at 546; see also id. at 554 (“At the very least, Ickes forecloses the possibility that the 
mere fact that an electronic device may contain massive amounts of personal data, by itself, can 
change the legal analysis at the border . . . .”). 
206. Id. at 546. 
207. Id. at 568.  
208. Id. at 564. 
209. Id. at 564–66.  
210. Id.; see also id. at 547 (“No matter how thorough or highly motivated the agent is, a manual 
search of a computer or digital device will never result in the human visualization of more than a 
fraction of the content of the device.”). 
211. Id. at 565 (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 543 (1985)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
212. Id. at 566–67. 
213. Id. at 567; cf. Abidor v. Napolitano, 990 F. Supp. 2d 260, 277 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (arguing that 
travelers should “[t]hink twice about the information [they] carry on [their] laptop” (first alteration 
in original)). 
214. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 567 (emphasis in original).  
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aspect of forensic digital searches that “stretches the computer-to-closed-
container analogy beyond its breaking point.”
215
 Third, a forensic search 
provides access to location information and other metadata that can 
reveal intimate information about a person, including even domestic 
activities traditionally protected by the Fourth Amendment.
216
 These 
factors led the court to conclude that “[i]t is difficult to conceive of a 
property search more invasive or intrusive than a forensic computer 
search—it essentially is a body cavity search of a computer.”
217
 
Despite strong language about the privacy and dignity interests in 
digital information, and acknowledgement that manual digital border 
searches could be “deeply probing” and “invasive,”
218
 the court 
maintained that manual digital border searches do not require any level 
of suspicion.
219
 The court reasoned that a manual digital border search is 
limited by the practicalities of the border context—especially the amount 
of time border agents can spend searching computers and cell phones.
220
 
The court was constrained by Ickes, which may have compelled that 
conclusion.
221
 The problem is that, while the court rejected the container 
analogy for forensic digital searches, it oddly reaffirmed it for other 
digital searches.
222
 In the court’s view, a digital border search can be 
analogized to the search of a suitcase, even if a forensic search cannot: 
[A manual digital] search has the same inherent limitations—
and the same inherent risk of invasiveness—irrespective of what 
is being searched. There is only a finite amount of time available 
for a CBP agent to detain a traveler at the border to search the 
contents of his suitcase or laptop.
223
 
Although Saboonchi and Cotterman have important differences,
224
 
                                                     
215. Id. 
216. Id. at 568–69 (“[A] Customs officer performing a forensic search can recreate the most 
intimate details of a person’s life over the course of the last several months—even if the data 
includes highly personal details of what transpired before leaving the country or while in one’s own 
home.”). 
217. Id. at 569. 
218. Id. at 547. 
219. Id. at 569. The court used the term “conventional” computer search to describe any digital 
search that is nonforensic, i.e., manual digital searches. See supra notes 141–53 and accompanying 
text. 
220. Id. at 564. 
221. Id. at 569. 
222. Id. at 564. 
223. Id. 
224. In particular, Saboonchi provides a more robust distinction between forensic digital searches 
and other digital searches. Cf. supra notes 196–202, 208–17 and accompanying text. 
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their broad strokes are similar. Both decisions establish that forensic 
digital searches are nonroutine and must be supported by reasonable 
suspicion.
225
 Both also reject analogies between forensic digital searches 
and searches of physical property, such as items in closed containers.
226
 
And yet, perhaps both courts did not embrace their own analyses 
enough. Both allow manual digital searches without suspicion.
227
 In this 
regard, both decisions allow digital fishing expeditions at the border, so 
long as they are carried out manually—which cuts against the Fourth 
Amendment requirement that searches be limited in scope.
228
 On all of 
these points, prior case law played a role. Arnold and Ickes shaped 
Cotterman and Saboonchi in significant ways, perhaps preventing the 
courts in both cases from considering the full range of standards 
available under the Fourth Amendment. 
III. DIGITAL BORDER SEARCHES 3.0: HOW SHOULD COURTS 
REGULATE DIGITAL BORDER SEARCHES AFTER RILEY v. 
CALIFORNIA? 
The Supreme Court has not yet decided what level of process the 
Fourth Amendment requires for a digital border search.
229
 But its 
decision in Riley v. California provides relevant guidance. Whereas the 
courts in Cotterman and Saboonchi were constrained by precedent,
230
 
                                                     
225. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2013); Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 
at 539. 
226. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 964; Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 567. 
227. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 959; Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 547. In Abidor v. Napolitano, the 
court declined to hold that reasonable suspicion is required for a forensic digital search because it 
would have no practical effect on current practice and may have a “chilling effect” on border 
officials. 990 F. Supp. 2d 260, 282 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). Nevertheless, the court “agree[d] with the 
Ninth Circuit that, if suspicionless forensic computer searches at the border threaten to become the 
norm, then some threshold showing of reasonable suspicion should be required.” Id. 
228. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (requiring courts to “determine whether 
the search as actually conducted ‘was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which 
justified the interference in the first place’” (citation omitted)). 
229. United States v. Kim, No. 13-cr-00100-ABJ, 2015 BL 134375, at *10 (D.D.C. May 8, 
2015), available at https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/kimruling.pdf. 
230. The Ninth Circuit’s distinction between forensic digital border searches and other digital 
border searches was central to its rationale in Cotterman and allowed it to affirm Arnold while 
narrowing that decision to its facts. See Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 967 (distinguishing between 
forensic and other digital searches); id. at 960 n.6 (narrowing Arnold). In Saboonchi, the court 
emphasized its opinion was consistent with the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Ickes. See Saboonchi, 
990 F. Supp. 2d at 552 (“Ickes makes it clear that a routine border search may include a 
conventional inspection of electronic media and a review of the files on them just as it may include 
physical papers.”); id. at 560 (“[T]he Fourth Circuit has stated [in Ickes] that a conventional search 
of a computer is not legally distinct from a conventional search of a closed container.”). 
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resulting in a limited debate over whether forensic digital searches 
require reasonable suspicion, Riley opens up a doctrinal path to 
reexamine digital border searches. In doing so, courts should consider 
the full range of standards provided by Fourth Amendment doctrine: a 
warrant based on probable cause, probable cause without a warrant, 
reasonable suspicion, or no suspicion at all. Indeed, courts and litigants 
have already begun debating Riley’s impact on this issue. Two federal 
district courts have interpreted Riley’s applicability to digital border 
searches in different ways.
231
 The defendant in one of those cases has 
argued on appeal to the Fourth Circuit that Riley changes the digital 
border search analysis.
232
 This Part discusses Riley, its implications for 
digital border searches, how two lower courts have analyzed digital 
border searches after the decision, and considerations for courts moving 
forward. 
A. Riley and the New Digital Search Calculus 
The Supreme Court held in Riley that police must obtain a warrant 
before searching the digital information on a cell phone incident to an 
individual’s arrest.
233
 The Court recognized that a search of digital 
information in a cell phone is categorically different from a search of 
one’s person or physical effects.
234
 To determine whether to exempt 
searches of cell phones incident to arrest from the warrant requirement, 
the Court applied a balancing test weighing the state’s interests in 
security and retaining evidence against the individual’s privacy 
interests.
235
 The Court concluded that digital information carries 
substantial privacy interests and is qualitatively and quantitatively 
different from any physical items individuals typically carry.
236
 The 
                                                     
231. See United States v. Saboonchi, No. 13-cr-00100, 2014 BL 207375, at *1 (D. Md. July 28, 
2014), available at https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/kimruling.pdf (rejecting 
motion for reconsideration in light of Riley, concluding that Riley does not change the border search 
exception and that the court’s decision is consistent with Riley anyway); Kim, 2015 BL 134375, at 
*20–22 (concluding that Riley gives courts clear guidance on digital border search analysis); Brief 
of Appellant, supra note 27, at 8–9 (arguing that under Riley digital border searches must be 
subjected to the warrant requirement); see also LAFAVE, supra note 64, § 10.5(f), at 7–8 (noting that 
“Cotterman certainly is bolstered” by Riley but that it is an open question “whether post-Riley courts 
will conclude that Cotterman does not go far enough”). 
232. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 27, at 8–9; Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU, supra note 27, 
at 2–3; Brief of Amicus Curiae EFF, supra note 27, at 3. 
233. Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014). 
234. Id. at 2489–91. 
235. Id. at 2484–85. 
236. Id. at 2489–91. 
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Court also found that the government’s interests in officer safety and 
preventing the destruction of evidence with regard to digital information 




The Court put technology at the center of its analysis, deciding the 
question of “how the search incident to arrest doctrine applies to modern 
cell phones.”
238
 The decision involved two cases and two types of cell 
phones: Riley v. California (smartphone)
239





 The Court has recognized that searches incident to 
arrest—where officers search an arrestee’s person or property found on 
or within the immediate control of the arrestee—are reasonable even 
without a warrant to: (1) protect officer safety and effectively carry out 
the arrest or (2) prevent the destruction of evidence.
242
 In resolving the 
issue, the Court rejected a “mechanical application” of its precedents in 
favor of reexamining the doctrine’s applicability in light of the fact that 
smartphones and flip phones “are based on technology nearly 
inconceivable just a few decades ago,” when the Court decided its 
leading search incident to arrest cases.
243
 
                                                     
237. Id. at 2485–87. 
238. Id. at 2484. 
239. In Riley, police searched the smartphone of David Riley after stopping him for driving with 
expired registration tags. The officer discovered that Riley’s license was suspended and impounded 
the car, while another officer conducted an inventory search of the car, finding two handguns hidden 
under the car’s hood. The officers then arrested Riley for possession of concealed and loaded 
firearms. One officer also searched Riley’s person, discovering a smartphone in his pocket. The 
officer began searching the cell phone. The officer noticed some words preceded by the letters 
“CK,” a label he believed stood for “Crip Killers,” a slang term for members of the Bloods gang. A 
detective at the police station further examined the contents of the phone, looking for evidence, and 
found photographs of Riley standing in front of a car they suspected had been involved in a shooting 
a few weeks earlier. Riley was ultimately charged in connection with the earlier shooting. Id. at 
2480–81. 
240. 612 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2009), rev’d, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Riley, 
134 S. Ct. 2473. 
241. In Wurie, police officers seized a “flip phone,” a cell phone with more-limited features than 
a smartphone, after arresting Brima Wurie on suspicion of making a drug sale. The phone received 
several incoming calls from a number labeled “my house” shortly after the officers took Wurie to 
the police station. The officers opened the phone, saw a picture of a woman and a baby set as the 
wallpaper, accessed the call log, and viewed the number named “my house.” The officers traced the 
phone to an apartment building, saw a woman that appeared to be the one on the phone’s wallpaper, 
and then obtained a warrant to search the apartment. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2481. 
242. Id. at 2483–84; Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338–40 (2009); United States v. Robinson, 
414 U.S. 218, 230–34 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969). “If there is no 
possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to search, 
both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not 
apply.” Arizona, 556 U.S. at 339. 
243. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484. 
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Under a balancing test used to determine whether to depart from the 
warrant requirement, the Court assessed “the degree to which [the type 
of search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy” against “the degree to 
which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.”
244
 In conducing this analysis, the Court asked whether 
applying the search incident to arrest doctrine to cell phones would 
“untether the rule from the justifications underlying 
the . . . exception.”
245
 
The Court first identified the government’s interests under Chimel v. 
California
246
 in security and preventing the destruction of evidence.
247
 
To protect these interests, the Court concluded that officers may still 
conduct a physical search of the cell phone.
248
 But because digital data 
itself cannot be used to physically harm an arresting officer, the 
government has little interest in immediately searching it on the basis of 
officer safety.
249
 Similarly, once the officer has the phone in custody, the 
arrestee cannot erase any evidence accessible through the phone. The 
Court did consider the government’s argument that digital evidence 
could be destroyed by remote wiping by absent third parties, but found 
that too distant from the government’s interests under Chimel, which are 
directly tied to the arrestee’s attempt to destroy or hide evidence at the 
scene of arrest.
250
 More important, the government can simply prevent 
remote wiping by disconnecting the phone from the network.
251
 Thus, 
while the government generally has substantial interests in security and 
preservation of evidence at the scene of an arrest, those interests are 
significantly lessened with respect to digital information in the search 
incident to arrest context.
252
 
The Court then assessed the individual interests in protecting digital 
information. In particular, Riley establishes that the “immense storage 
                                                     
244. Id. at 2484–85. 
245. Id. at 2485. 
246. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
247. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2483. 
248. “[O]fficers remain free to examine the physical aspects of a phone to ensure that it will not 
be used as a weapon.” Id. at 2485; cf. supra notes 141–42 and accompanying text (discussing a 
“physical device search”). 
249. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485. 
250. Id. at 2485–86. “Remote wiping occurs when a phone, connected to a wireless network, 
receives a signal that erases stored data. This can happen when a third party sends a remote signal or 
when a phone is preprogrammed to delete data upon entering or leaving certain geographic areas 
(so-called ‘geofencing’).” Id. at 2486. 
251. Id. at 2487. 
252. Id. at 2485. 
17 - Miller.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/21/2015  8:10 PM 
1978 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1943 
 
capacity” of modern cell phones marks a quantitative difference from 
other physical items people typically carry.
253
 The storage capacity of 
modern cell phones has several “interrelated consequences for 
privacy.”
254
 First, it collects in one place many different kinds of 
information—photos, picture messages, text messages, internet browsing 
history, a calendar, a thousand-entry phone book, etc.—that reveal more 
information than any isolated record.
255
 Second, digital information 
accessible via cell phones allows a search to reveal information that is 
not even stored on the phone.
256
 Third, data on or accessible through the 
phone can date back to the purchase or even earlier.
257
 Fourth, there is an 
element of “pervasiveness that characterizes cell phones but not physical 
records.”
258
 Almost everyone carries around “a digital record of nearly 
every aspect of their lives—from the mundane to the intimate.”
259
 
Cell phones also present qualitative differences.
260
 Internet searches 
and browsing history can reveal an individual’s private interests or 
concerns, and the location information retained by cell phones can reveal 
where an individual has been.
261
 Cell phone apps manage detailed 
information about one’s life, from political affiliation to addictions, 
prayer, tracking pregnancy and other health symptoms, planning one’s 
budget, and improving one’s love life.
262
 
The unique quantitative and qualitative aspects of digital information 
stored on or accessed by a cell phone persuaded the Court to conclude 
that searching a phone is even more intrusive than searching a home: 
Indeed, a cell phone search would typically expose to the 
                                                     
253. Id. at 2489 (noting that a typical smartphone has a storage capacity of sixteen gigabytes, 
which translates to millions of pages of text, thousands of pictures, or hundreds of videos). 
254. Id.  
255. Id. 
256. Id. (“The sum of an individual’s private life can be reconstructed through a thousand 
photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions; the same cannot be said of a photograph 
or two of loved ones tucked into a wallet.”). 
257. Id. (“A person might carry in his pocket a slip of paper reminding him to call Mr. Jones; he 
would not carry a record of all his communications with Mr. Jones for the past several months, as 
would routinely be kept on a phone.”). 
258. Id. at 2490. 
259. Id.; see also Scott Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 159, 208–09, 
214 (2015) (discussing Riley’s emphasis on the heightened importance of intimate and political 
information, both accessible via searches of cell phones). 
260. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490. 
261. Id. (“Historic location information is a standard feature on many smart phones and can 
reconstruct someone’s specific movements down to the minute, not only around town but also 
within a particular building.”). 
262. Id. 
17 - Miller.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/21/2015  8:10 PM 
2015] DIGITAL BORDER SEARCHES AFTER RILEY 1979 
 
government far more than the most exhaustive search of a 
house: A phone not only contains in digital form many sensitive 
records previously found in the home; it also contains a broad 
array of private information never found in a home in any 
form—unless the phone is.
263
 
Weighing the intrusiveness of a digital search against the government’s 
interests in officer safety and preservation of evidence, the Court held 
that officers must generally secure a warrant before searching a cell 
phone incident to arrest.
264
 
B. The Implications of Riley: Digital Is Different 
Riley clarifies an important doctrinal debate over digital searches. 
Prior to Riley, lower courts were split over two different approaches.
265
 
Courts debated whether digital information is merely physical evidence 
in digital form, such that traditional rules of search and seizure apply, or 




Under one theory, courts should treat digital files like paper 
documents and computers like filing cabinets or containers—mere 
repositories for digital documents.
267
 Thus the government does not need 
to specify whether it is searching for digital or paper documents, and 
courts look to traditional methods of limiting searches to ensure they are 
conducted reasonably—for example, by limiting a search according to 
the nature of the criminal activity alleged or the nature of the evidence 
sought.
268
 Perhaps the most significant consequence of this theory is that 
officers may broadly search digital information in order to ascertain 
what it is
269
 and may seize any evidence in “plain view” pursuant to a 
                                                     
263. Id. at 2491. 
264. Id. at 2484–85. 
265. See CLANCY, supra note 47, § 12.4.8.2, at 684–98. 
266. Id. § 12.4.8.2, at 684–85. 
267. Id. § 12.4.8.2.1, at 686 n.166 (collecting cases); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
supra note 42, at 7. 
268. See CLANCY, supra note 47, § 12.4.8.2.1, at 686–89. 
269. This supposedly follows from Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976), in which the 
Court accepted cursory examination of documents in order to verify which ones were within the 
proper scope of the search:  
In searches for papers, it is certain that some innocuous documents will be examined, at least 
cursorily, in order to determine whether they are, in fact, among those papers authorized to be 
seized . . . . [R]esponsible officials, including judicial officials, must take care to assure that 
they are conducted in a manner that minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon privacy.  
Id. at 482 n.11. 
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 As one court explained: 
[Police officers] may search the location authorized by the 
warrant, including any containers at that location that are 
reasonably likely to contain items described in the 
warrant. . . . This container rationale is equally applicable to 
nontraditional, technological “containers” that are reasonably 
likely to hold information in less tangible forms.
271
 
Analogizing computers to containers rests on the assumption that the 
technological differences between them amount to little, so far as Fourth 
Amendment doctrine is concerned. 
Other courts have instead adopted a “special approach.”
272
 Under this 
theory, the container/filing cabinet analogy fails to account for the 
technological differences between digital information and physical 
objects.
273
 Computers offer a fundamentally different system of storage 
and information, present unique privacy concerns—particularly in light 
of the plain view doctrine—and provide ways in which to minimize the 
intrusiveness of a digital search.
274
 At least one author of a Fourth 
Amendment treatise argued ahead of Riley that the special approach has 
“no foundation in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, even by 
                                                     
270. CLANCY, supra note 47, § 12.4.8.2, at 684. Under the plain view doctrine, an officer may 
size evidence without a warrant if (1) the officer is in a legitimate position to see the evidence, (2) 
the officer is in a location to seize the evidence lawfully, and (3) the incriminating character of the 
evidence is immediately apparent. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136–37 (1990); CLANCY, 
supra note 47, § 7.4.2.4, at 378. The Court has stated the rationale for the plain view doctrine is:  
[I]f contraband is left in open view and is observed by a police officer from a lawful vantage 
point, there has been no invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy and thus no ‘search’ 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment—or at least no search independent of the initial 
intrusion that gave the officers their vantage point. 
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993). But the plain view doctrine cannot be used to 
turn a somewhat limited intrusion into a general search. As Justice Stewart stated for the plurality in 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), “the ‘plain view’ doctrine may not be used to 
extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last 
emerges.” Id. at 466. 
271. People v. Gall, 30 P.3d 145, 153 (Colo. 2001) (en banc); see also United States v. Arnold, 
533 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Courts have long held that searches of closed containers and 
their contents can be conducted at the border without particularized suspicion under the Fourth 
Amendment.”). 
272. CLANCY, supra note 47, § 12.4.8.2.2, at 689–98; see, e.g., United States v. Comprehensive 
Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859 
(9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Carey, 
172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999); see also Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and 
Computer Data, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75 (1994).  
273. See United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 567 (D. Md. 2014). 
274. See CLANCY, supra note 47, § 12.4.8.2.3, at 692–94. 
17 - Miller.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/21/2015  8:10 PM 




 and that the Court’s prior refusal to rank different types of 
containers by privacy interest
276
 would lead the Court to reject the 
special approach for “electronic device containers.”
277
 
The doctrinal debate over how to treat digital information under the 
Fourth Amendment formed a major part of the backdrop to Riley and 
explains at least part of that decision’s significance.
278
 In rejecting the 
federal government’s argument that a search of data on a cell phone is 
“materially indistinguishable” from searches of physical items, the Court 
said: 
That is like saying a ride on horseback is materially 
indistinguishable from a flight to the moon. Both are ways of 
getting from point A to point B, but little else justifies lumping 
them together. Modern cell phones, as a category, implicate 
privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of a 
cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse. A conclusion that inspecting 
the contents of an arrestee’s pockets works no substantial 
additional intrusion on privacy beyond the arrest itself may 
make sense as applied to physical items, but any extension of 
that reasoning to digital data has to rest on its own bottom.
279
 
The Court’s categorical language—“cell phones, as a category”—
demonstrates the Court’s emphatic rejection of the view that the digital 
information stored on cell phones and computers may always be 
searched according to the same rules as physical items.
280
 The Court 
                                                     
275. Id. § 12.4.8.2.3, at 692. 
276. The Court rejected the proposition that there was any Fourth Amendment distinction 
between “worthy” and “unworthy” containers:  
For just as the most frail cottage in the kingdom is absolutely entitled to the same guarantees of 
privacy as the most majestic mansion, so also may a traveler who carries a toothbrush and a 
few articles of clothing in a paper bag or knotted scarf claim an equal right to conceal his 
possessions from official inspection as the sophisticated executive with the locked attaché case. 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982).  
277. CLANCY, supra note 47, § 12.4.8.2.3, at 697. 
278. One scholar wrote in reaction to the decision that Riley would usher in more doctrinal 
change:  
In a nearly unanimous opinion packed with references to gigabytes, apps, and the cloud, Chief 
Justice John Roberts proved that the Justices get it. They get that digital technologies are 
different from anything our culture has seen before. They get that people are using those 
technologies in a million dynamic ways that were unimaginable a generation ago. And they get 
that, in at least some contexts, the Old Rules need to change.  
Richard M. Re, Symposium: Inaugurating the Digital Fourth Amendment, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 
2014, 12:37 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-inaugurating-the-digital-fourth-
amendment/. 
279. Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488–89 (2014). 
280. Id. at 2489 (“Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other 
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further noted that advances in cloud computing—which allow users of 
cell phones and other networked devices to access data stored 
remotely
281
—underscore the differences between modern cell phones 
and physical containers. “Treating a cell phone as a container whose 
contents may be searched incident to an arrest is a bit strained as an 
initial matter. But the analogy crumbles entirely when a cell phone is 
used to access data located elsewhere, at the tap of a screen.”
282
 
C. Riley’s Relevance to Border Searches 
Two federal courts have considered the effect of Riley on digital 
border searches.
283
 They have disagreed over whether the analysis in 
Riley applies and, even if it does apply, the extent to which it changes 
how courts must regulate digital border searches. 
1. United States v. Saboonchi 
Saboonchi filed a motion for reconsideration after Riley, arguing that 
the Supreme Court decision changes the digital border search analysis.
284
 
The court denied the motion on two grounds: (1) that Riley “did not 
touch on the border search exception” and (2) the court’s previous 
decision was consistent with the principles outlined in Riley.
285
 On the 
first point, the court in Saboonchi reasoned that Riley “did not recognize 
a categorical privilege for electronic data,” and expressly noted that 
other exceptions, such as in exigent circumstances, may still justify the 
warrantless search of a cell phone.
286
 In the court’s view, this indicated 
that the Supreme Court did not intend to “exempt cell phones from all 
                                                     
objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person. The term ‘cell phone’ is itself misleading 
shorthand; many of these devices are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to 
be used as a telephone. They could just as easily be called cameras, video players, rolodexes, 
calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers.”). “Cloud 
computing is the capacity of internet-connected devices to display data stored on remote servers 
rather than on the device itself.” Id. at 2491. 
281. See Lon A. Berk, After Jones, the Deluge: The Fourth Amendment’s Treatment of 
Information, Big Data and the Cloud, 14 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1, 4–6 (2014) (explaining how cloud 
computing allows users of cell phones and other networked devices to access data stored on remote 
servers). 
282. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491 (citation omitted). 
283. United States v. Saboonchi, 48 F. Supp. 3d 815, 816 (D. Md. 2014); United States v. Kim, 
No. 13-cr-00100-ABJ, 2015 BL 134375 (D.D.C. May 8, 2015), available at 
https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/kimruling.pdf.  
284. Saboonchi, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 816. 
285. Id. 
286. Id. at 817. 
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 The court also reasoned that the Supreme Court 
has limited searches incident to arrest with respect to closed containers, 
whereas it has always indicated that suspicionless searches of containers 
are permitted under the border search exception.
288
 
On the second point, the court concluded that Riley supports the 
conclusion that forensic digital searches are qualitatively different from 
other digital searches.
289
 The court acknowledged that the search in Riley 
was not forensic, but explained that “the underlying logic in the two 
cases is the same.”
290
 The invasiveness of the search “is only part of the 
puzzle.”
291
 Moreover, the court reasoned, Riley did not change the 
government’s interests in national security and immigration and customs 
enforcement in the border context.
292
 Applying the balancing test, the 
court agreed that cell phones deserve the “highest level of Fourth 
Amendment protection available,” but could not find “a single case” 




2. United States v. Kim 
The District Court for the District of Columbia took a different 
approach in United States v. Kim.
294
 The court embraced Riley as a 
decision giving courts clear guidance that is directly applicable to digital 
border searches.
295
 The court ruled in favor of Kim’s motion to suppress 
evidence extracted from his laptop, which federal agents had seized from 




DHS investigators suspected Kim, who had business operations in 
California and Korea, was involved in a 2008 shipment of aircraft parts 
used in aircraft and missile systems to a Chinese businessman in Korea, 
who then sent them on to customers in Iran, in violation of the federal 
                                                     
287. Id. at 818. 
288. Id. 
289. Id. at 819. 
290. Id. 
291. Id.  
292. Id. 
293. Id.  
294. No. 13-cr-00100-ABJ, 2015 BL 134375 (D.D.C. May 8, 2015), available at 
https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/kimruling.pdf. 
295. Id. at *20–21. 
296. Id. at *1, *26. 
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 The special agent in charge of the investigation 
decided to stop Kim the next time he left the country to search his laptop 
for evidence in support of the allegation.
298
 The agent stopped Kim just 
before Kim boarded his flight and took his laptop, informing him that he 
was conducting a border search and would return the computer once the 
search was complete.
299
 The agent permitted Kim to board his flight.
300
  
The agent did not search the laptop at the airport. Instead, he sent it to 
DHS’s San Diego Computer Forensics Group and “requested a border 
search of the laptop.”
301
 The agent in charge of the computer search 
created a forensic image, or duplicate copy, of Kim’s hard drive, so that 
the agent could read and analyze “every single piece of data on the hard 
drive.”
302
 The agent used specialized software to extract, process, and 
identify thousands of files matching keywords suggested by the first 
agent.
303
 The first agent spent “several days” reviewing the files, which 
supported the allegations against Kim, leading to criminal charges.
304
 
After the search, the first agent applied for a search warrant to conduct 
“forensic imaging . . . and identification and extraction of relevant 
data”
305




Federal prosecutors made three arguments for why the search was 
permissible. First, they argued that the search was allowed under Ramsey 
because “a laptop is nothing more than a sort of container.”
307
 This 
argument is somewhat remarkable, given the Supreme Court’s clear 
rejection of analogizing cell phones to containers in Riley.
308
 The court 
dismissed this line of reasoning on that basis.
309
 The government also 
                                                     
297. Id. at *1–2. 
298. Id. at *1; see also id. at *25 (“[T]he investigators’ sworn testimony to the Court made it 
clear that the primary, if not the sole, purpose of the pre-planned encounter at the border was to 
obtain the laptop and search it for evidence.”). 
299. Id. at *6–7. 
300. Id. at *7. 
301. Id.  
302. Id.  
303. Id. at *7–8.  
304. Id. at *13.  
305. Id. at *9. 
306. Id. at *1–2, *26. Both special agents testified that no search occurred after the warrant was 
approved. Id. at 26. 
307. Id. at *10. 
308. See Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488–89, 2491 (2014); supra Part III.B. 
309. Kim, 2015 BL 134375, at *23 (“Riley indicates that the Fourth Amendment is not 
necessarily satisfied by a simplistic likening of a computer to a searchable ‘container.’”); see also 
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argued that the search was lawful either as a routine border search or, 
alternatively, as a forensic search supported by reasonable suspicion.
310
 
The court first addressed whether the government established 
reasonable suspicion, and found that it did not.
311
 In particular, the court 
concluded that the basis for the search was the agent’s expectation that 
the computer contained evidence of past criminal activity, “but there 
was no objective manifestation that Kim was or was ‘about to be 
engaged’ in criminal activity at the time.”
312
 With respect to Kim’s 
travel, “the search was nothing more than a fishing expedition”—a 
factor that distinguished the search in Kim from those in Cotterman and 
the recent decision in United States v. Hassanshahi.
313
 
The court then examined whether the search was “forensic,” as in 
Cotterman and Saboonchi, or routine. It found that the search “fell 
somewhere on the spectrum between the two poles described by other 
courts.”
314
 The agents did not search through deleted files, but they 
copied the entire hard drive and could have conducted a more 
comprehensive search if necessary.
315
 The government argued the use of 
forensic software was not essential to the search because anyone with 
unlimited time could locate the same files.
316
 Nevertheless, the agents 
confiscated the computer, created an exact copy of the hard drive, used 
whatever software they determined necessary for the search, and kept a 
copy of the data for “a period of unlimited duration.”
317
 “Certainly no 




The lack of a clear distinction between a forensic search requiring 
reasonable suspicion and a routine border search persuaded the court to 
turn to Riley’s balancing test.
319
 Under Riley, analyzing the 
                                                     
id. at *17 (“[G]iven the vast storage capacity of even the most basic laptops, and the capacity of 
computers to retain metadata and even deleted material, one cannot treat an electronic storage 
device like a handbag simply because you can put things in it and then carry it onto a plane.”). 
310. Id. at *10. 
311. See id. at *13. 
312. Id. 
313. 75 F. Supp. 3d 101 (D.D.C. 2014); Kim, 2015 BL 134375, at *13. 
314. Kim, 2015 BL 134375, at *20. 
315. Id. at *19. 
316. Id. at *19–21. 
317. Id. at *19. 
318. Id.  
319. Id. at *20. The government’s “forensic specialist also acknowledged that the term ‘forensic 
search’ can describe a range of examinations and that the term has no specific definition.” Id. at 
*19. 
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reasonableness of a digital search that begins at the border “does not 
simply end with the invocation of a statute or the well-recognized border 
exception, as broad as it may be, and it does not turn on the application 
of an undefined term like ‘forensic.’”
320
 As in Riley, the court considered 
whether applying the border search exception to digital searches at the 




The court reasoned that travelers leaving the country implicated only 
the government’s interest in exporting regulations, in contrast to 
government interests implicated by travelers entering the country, such 
as protecting national security and preventing smuggling.
322
 The court 
concluded that, “while the immediate national security concerns were 
somewhat attenuated, the invasion of privacy was substantial.”
323
 
Whatever the line between a forensic and a conventional digital search, 
“this search was qualitatively and quantitatively different from a routine 
border examination, and therefore, it was unreasonable given the paucity 
of grounds to suspect that criminal activity was in progress.”
324
  
The court questioned whether the digital search that took place “can 
accurately be characterized as a border search at all.”
325
 The court noted 
that the laptop may have been seized at the border, but it was then 
transported 150 miles away to a facility in San Diego, where DHS 
copied the hard drive and thoroughly searched the copy over a period of 
weeks.
 326
 DHS found nothing suspicious in Kim’s luggage, permitted 
him to board his flight, and returned his laptop to him.
327
 The actual 
search took place away from the border, involved a detailed list of 
keywords, and took weeks to complete, while the subject of the search 
was allowed to cross the border unhindered.
328
 For these reasons, the 
search “did not possess the characteristics of a border search or other 
regular inspection procedures. It more resembled the common nonborder 
search based on individualized suspicion, which must be prefaced by the 
usual warrant and probable cause standards.”
329
 
                                                     
320. Id. at *22. 
321. Id. 
322. Id. at *23–24. 





328. Id.  
329. Id. at *25 (quoting United States v. Brennan, 538 F.2d 711, 716 (5th Cir. 1976)) (internal 
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D. How Riley Changes the Digital Border Search Doctrine 
The Court has described the border search exception as similar to the 
search incident to arrest exception.
331
 Both exceptions involve situations 
where the government has specific heightened interests and the subject 
of the search has a reduced expectation of privacy.
332
 Riley suggests that 
courts should reconsider the developing digital border search doctrine. In 
particular, courts should consider afresh whether to extend the border 
search exception to searches of digital information in light of changes in 
technology and societal expectations.
333
 Would applying the border 
search exception to a search of digital information that begins at the 




The border search doctrine has been traditionally associated with the 
federal government’s right to prevent unwanted people and contraband 
from entering the country to protect national security, regulate 
immigration, and enforce customs restrictions.
335
 The Court articulated 
the doctrine long before the development and widespread use of laptop 
computers, smartphones, and cloud computing. Riley recognized the gap 
between the search incident to arrest exception and these technological 
changes as grounds for reexamining the doctrine.
336
 After Riley, the time 
is ripe for a reassessment to properly account for the differences between 
a search for digital information—which may not even be stored locally 
                                                     
quotation marks omitted). 
330. Appellant United States of America’s Unopposed Motion for Voluntary Dismissal of 
Interlocutory Appeal Pursuant to Rule 42(b), United States v. Kim, No. 15-03035 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 
11, 2015). 
331. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 621 (1972) (describing the border search exception 
as “like the similar ‘search incident to lawful arrest’ exception”). 
332. See Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488 (2014) (“The search incident to 
arrest exception rests not only on the heightened government interests at stake in a volatile arrest 
situation, but also on an arrestee’s reduced privacy interests upon being taken into police custody.”); 
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 539–40 (1985) (“[N]ot only is the 
expectation of privacy less at the border than in the interior . . . the Fourth Amendment balance 
between the interests of the Government and the privacy right of the individual is also struck much 
more favorably to the Government at the border.” (citations omitted)). 
333. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484. 
334. See id. at 2485; Kim, 2015 BL 134375, at *22. 
335. See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619; supra Part I.B. 
336. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484. 
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—and searches of a person, luggage, or vehicle. 
Riley shows courts how to analyze this question. In deciding whether 
to exempt digital searches at the border from the baseline warrant 
requirement, courts must balance the intrusiveness of the search against 
the governmental interests that have traditionally justified the 
exception.
338
 If courts find that the border exception does not apply to 
digital border searches, they must revert to the baseline warrant 
requirement.
339
 But even if they find that the exception does apply, Riley 
weighs in favor of greater Fourth Amendment protection and a higher 
level of suspicion required for all digital border searches. 
1. Individual Interests  
Riley is particularly instructive with respect to the individual interests 
implicated by digital searches. The decision provides three main 
insights. 
First, courts no longer have to guess as to the intrusiveness of a digital 
search; Riley recognizes there are significant privacy implications.
340
 
Indeed, the Court found that digital searches can be even more intrusive 
than the search of an individual’s home—which has traditionally 
received the highest protection under the Fourth Amendment.
341
 This 
finding alone would justify the conclusion that a digital search is beyond 
the scope of the traditional border search doctrine. 
Second, Riley makes it clear that digital searches of smartphones and 
computers are categorically different from searches of luggage.
342
 This 
conclusion finally discredits the analogy between computers and filing 
                                                     
337. Some may wonder whether the fact that data is stored in the cloud rather than locally on a 
device should result in less Fourth Amendment protection under the third-party doctrine. But see 
Ryan Watzel, Riley’s Implications for Fourth Amendment Protection in the Cloud, 124 YALE L.J. F. 
73, 73–74 (2014) (arguing that Riley suggests the Court’s willingness to reconsider the third-party 
doctrine and recognize Fourth Amendment protection for personal data stored in the cloud); 
Shappert, supra note 24, at 13 (recommending that, after Riley, border officials disconnect 
electronic devices from networks and obtain a warrant before searching remotely stored data). 
338. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484–85. 
339. See id. at 2482. 
340. See supra notes 253–63, and accompanying text. It would be difficult for courts to argue that 
laptops and tablets deserve less protection than cell phones. In Riley, the Court compared cell 
phones to computers to illustrate the intrusiveness of searching them: “The term ‘cell phone’ is itself 
misleading shorthand; many of these devices are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have the 
capacity to be used as a telephone.” Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489. 
341. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491 (noting that phones contain sensitive records typically found in a 
home as well as private information that is not found in the home).  
342. See supra Part III.B. 
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cabinets—on which Arnold and Ickes expressly relied.
343
 This finding 
should encourage courts to move away from the analyses in Arnold and 
Ickes, as well as Cotterman’s acceptance of the search in Arnold
344
 and 




Third, Riley strongly supports applying the same rule to all digital 
searches and rejecting distinctions between manual and forensic digital 
searches. Riley consolidated two cases, one involving a smartphone, the 
other involving a flip phone.
346
 The Court could have concluded that the 
technological differences between smartphones and flip phones should 
give rise to different standards, because a smartphone generally has 
more advanced capabilities and could reveal more information than the 
search of a flip phone.
347




The Court also applied a categorical approach—using the same rule 
for all digital searches—because it is easier for law enforcement to 
follow and provides greater certainty for individuals.
349
 Applying a 
categorical approach to both exceptions comports better with the Fourth 
Amendment’s particularity element, which requires searches to be 
limited in scope and tethered to the rationale justifying the initial 
intrusion.
350
 Indeed, the Court rejected several of the government’s 
arguments that officers should be able to search only certain information 
on a cell phone because such line drawing would be difficult for courts 
to administer.
351
 For example, allowing a search of only information that 
was potentially pertinent to the reason for arrest “would in effect give 
‘police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a 
person’s private effects.’”
352
 Similarly, allowing officers to search only 
information they could have searched if there exists a predigital 
analogue “would launch courts on a difficult line-drawing expedition to 
                                                     
343. See supra Part III.B. 
344. See supra notes 199–201 and accompanying text. 
345. See supra notes 218–23 and accompanying text. 
346. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2481. 
347. Id. at 2485. 
348. See id. (applying the holding to “cell phones,” not “smartphones”). 
349. See id. at 2491–92 (noting the Court’s “general preference to provide clear guidance to law 
enforcement through categorical rules. ‘[I]f police are to have workable rules, the balancing of the 
competing interests . . . must in large part be done on a categorical basis’” (alterations in original) 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
350. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985). 
351. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2492–93. 
352. Id. at 2492 (citation omitted). 
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determine which digital files are comparable to physical records” and 
“keep defendants and judges guessing for years to come.”
353
 
Requiring a warrant or reasonable suspicion for forensic digital 
searches but not manual ones would encourage border officials to 
manually conduct limitless exploratory digital searches. It would also 
lead to inconsistent constitutional protections. In a search incident to 
arrest, police would need a warrant to view the last call someone made 
on a flip phone. Meanwhile, border officials could manually search 
through someone’s smartphone and laptop computer for hours or even 
days—so long as it fell short of a forensic search, which could simply 
mean the use of sophisticated software—just because the owner of the 
devices took a daytrip to Canada.
354
 As the Ninth Circuit stated in 
Cotterman, “[a] person’s digital life ought not be hijacked simply by 
crossing a border.” Finally, while it may be true that a forensic search is 
more intrusive, Riley indicates that a certain threshold of intrusiveness is 
met once a government official has a person’s digital life in hand.
355
 
Applying different standards to forensic and manual digital searches cuts 
against the Court’s logic in Riley, neglects the privacy harms of a 
manual search, and is unworkable.
356
 
Courts should also consider the burdens on individuals, who have a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in their digital information.
357
 Anyone 
who wishes to keep digital information secure would be wise to encrypt 
everything, which still does not eliminate the risk of confiscation, or 
simply refrain from traveling internationally with cell phones, laptops, 
and tablets.
358
 But the rapid adoption of electronic devices and frequent 
travel with them suggest that society is not ready to accept that kind of 
limit.
359




                                                     
353. Id. at 2493 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
354.  United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 965 (9th Cir. 2013). 
355. See id. 
356. See supra notes 314–19 and accompanying text; Brief of Amicus Curiae EFF, supra note 27, 
at 15–20 (arguing that a distinction between manual and forensic searches of digital devices is 
“meaningless and constitutionally unworkable”). 
357. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2488–89. 
358. See Abidor v. Napolitano, 990 F. Supp. 2d 260, 277 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); Givens, supra note 1. 
359. See supra notes 28–40 and accompanying text. 
360. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (“[M]odern cell phones . . . are now such a pervasive and 
insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an 
important feature of human anatomy.”). 
17 - Miller.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/21/2015  8:10 PM 
2015] DIGITAL BORDER SEARCHES AFTER RILEY 1991 
 
2. Governmental Interests 
Riley also provides useful guidance for evaluating the government’s 
interests under the balancing test used to determine whether to exempt 
digital searches at the border from the warrant requirement.
361
 It instructs 
courts to identify the relevant governmental interests as those that make 
up the traditional rationale for the exception, rather than the broader 
array of general law enforcement interests the government claims. Riley 
also counsels courts to examine the extent to which compliance with the 
warrant requirement would burden the government’s ability to promote 
its traditional interests at the border. 
The government has a wide range of interests and obligations at the 
border, but not all of them justify the border search exception. The 
longstanding rationale for the exception is based on the government’s 
interests in protecting national security, regulating immigration, and 
preventing the smuggling of people or contraband.
362
 The government 
urges courts to take a much broader view. As justification for 
suspicionless and warrantless digital searches, CBP and ICE assert 
interests in general law enforcement.
363
 Certainly, CBP and ICE officials 
are authorized and obligated to carry out a range of responsibilities, 
including general law enforcement and cooperation with other law 
enforcement agencies.
364
 But the Court has never announced a broad 




Given the intrusiveness of digital searches, courts should adhere to 
the more specific interests the Court has used to justify the exception and 
resist conflating the statutory authority of border officials with the 
traditional justifications for the exception. In Riley, the Court examined 
the traditional rationales for the search incident to arrest exception—
officer safety and preservation of evidence—not broad interests in law 
                                                     
361. Id. 
362. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 153 (2004); United States v. Ramsey, 431 
U.S. 606, 620 (1977) (“The border-search exception is grounded in the recognized right of the 
sovereign to control, subject to substantive limitations imposed by the Constitution, who and what 
may enter the country.”); see supra Part I.B–C. 
363. CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 2, § 5.4.1.2, at 7 (CBP may retain “information relating to 
immigration, customs, and other enforcement matters” without probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion); ICE DIRECTIVE, supra note 2, § 8.5(1), at 7 (“ICE may retain information relevant to 
immigration, customs, and other law enforcement matters” without probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion). 
364. See Brief of Appellee United States, at 26–27, United States v. Saboonchi, No. 15-4111 (4th 
Cir. Nov. 18, 2015) (listing statutory authority of border officials). 
365. See generally supra Part I.B–C. 
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enforcement or newly asserted governmental interests.
366
 At the border 
there should be some nexus between the search and the interests the 
Court has recognized as the basis for the exception.  
As part of identifying the relevant government interests, courts should 
identify which interests are at stake in the search. For example, in Kim, 
the court found that the exit search implicated the government’s interest 
in enforcing customs restrictions but not its interests in national security 
or general law enforcement.
367
  
As a contrary example, in its appeal in Saboonchi the government 
argues that “the purposes underlying the border search doctrine apply in 
full force to searches of electronic media, which can contain contraband 
(such as child pornography) or material (such as classified information 
or malware) that, if illicitly transferred beyond our borders, could pose a 
direct threat to our national security.”
368
 Courts must be more precise. 
Certainly, some digital information in the wrong hands could pose a 
threat to national security—for example, terrorist plans or certain 
classified information. Child pornography, on the other hand, implicates 
the right of the government to exclude contraband; it poses no “direct 
threat” to national security. Whether malware poses a threat to national 
security likely has more to do with U.S. cybersecurity systems and 
practices than whether border officials can conduct suspicionless digital 
searches. In any case, at least in the Saboonchi appeal, the government 




Riley is useful here as well. There, the Court rejected arguments by 
California and the United States that speculative or unlikely threats 
should trump such significant privacy interests protected by the Fourth 
Amendment. California and the United States argued that officers should 
be able to search a cell phone incident to arrest in case it would alert 
them to associates of the arrestee heading to the scene.
370
 The Court 
found there was “undoubtedly a strong government interest in warning 
officers about such possibilities, but neither the United States nor 
California offers evidence to suggest that their concerns are based on 
                                                     
366. See Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014) (examining traditional 
rationales for the search incident to arrest exception); see supra notes 240–52 and accompanying 
text. 
367. See United States v. Kim, No. 13-cr-00100-ABJ, 2015 BL 134375, at *23–24 (D.D.C. May 
8, 2015), available at https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/kimruling.pdf. 
368. Brief of Appellee United States, supra note 364, at 31–32. 
369. See id. 
370. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485. 
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 California and the United States also argued that 
encryption or remote wiping could inhibit officers from preserving 
evidence.
372
 But the Court had “been given little reason to believe that 
either problem is prevalent.”
373
 This part of the Court’s analysis suggests 
that, where there are significant individual interests that ordinarily enjoy 
constitutional protection, the government bears the burden of 
demonstrating that its interests should prevail. 
After identifying the relevant government interests—national 
security, immigration, and customs—courts should examine how 
compliance with the warrant requirement would inhibit the 
government’s ability to protect those interests. In Riley, the Court 
analyzed multiple ways in which officers could secure a cell phone 
incident to arrest, obviating the need for an immediate search to preserve 
evidence.
374
 The Court also noted that other needs—such as securing the 
scene—suggest that immediately searching a cell phone is a relatively 
low priority in the ordinary case.
375
  
Border searches take place in a comparable context because of the 
government’s ability to regulate the movement of people and goods. For 
example, even with a warrant requirement for a digital search, border 
officials could still temporarily detain the device’s owner on the basis of 
reasonable suspicion and investigate further, reducing or eliminating the 
need for an immediate suspicionless and warrantless digital search.
376
 To 
draw this conclusion is not to belittle the government’s interests at the 
border, which are significant. Rather, it is simply to point out that, in 
assessing the burden on the government, courts should examine whether 
it is necessary for the government to conduct suspicionless digital 
searches to promote its traditional border interests. 
Courts should also pay attention to the practical realities of the border 
context when assessing potential burdens on the government. Given the 
millions of travelers carrying electronic devices, border officials lack the 
resources to conduct widespread suspicionless and warrantless digital 
                                                     
371. Id. 
372. Id. at 2486. 
373. Id. 
374. Id. at 2486–88. 
375. Id. 
376. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985) (holding that 
temporary seizure of individual seeking entrance to the United States was justified by reasonable 
suspicion that she was smuggling cocaine in her alimentary canal); cf. Almeida-Sanchez v. United 
States, 413 U.S. 266, 291 (1973) (describing the government’s power to exclude noncitizens). 
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 They must prioritize. Requiring reasonable suspicion for 
digital searches is likely to impose minimal burdens on existing 
practice.
378
 As DHS itself acknowledges, “officers very likely do have 
reasonable suspicion in most searches of electronic devices based on 
existing screening methods and objective factors.”
379
 Obtaining a 
warrant has become simple and fast, taking less than five minutes in 
some jurisdictions.
380
 Moreover, other existing exceptions, such as 




This is not to say that requiring a warrant (or reasonable suspicion) 
would impose no potential costs in efficiency or convenience to law 
enforcement. There may be situations where officers have “hard-to-
articulate intuitions or hunches” but decline to search an electronic 
device because there are no objective indications of suspicion.
382
 But the 
Court in Riley expressed skepticism about speculative or unlikely 
reasons for departing from the warrant requirement when such 
significant individual interests are at stake. And requiring a warrant 
would hardly put digital information out of reach. Under a probable 
cause standard border officials would only need to demonstrate there is a 
“fair probability”
383
 that an electronic device contains evidence relating 
to national security interests or potential immigration or customs 
violations, or that the individual searched threatens the government’s 
national security interests or seeks to violate immigration or customs 
laws. A reasonable suspicion standard would require even less.
384
 
Moreover, the warrant requirement is “an important working part of our 
machinery of government,” not merely “an inconvenience to be 
somehow ‘weighed’ against the claims of police efficiency.”
385
  
                                                     
377. See United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 967 n.14 (9th Cir. 2013); U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., supra note 42, at 4. 
378. See Abidor v. Napolitano, 990 F. Supp. 2d 260, 282 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
379. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 42, at 17. 
380. See Missouri v. McNeely, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1573 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
381. See Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014). 
382. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 42, at 17. 
383. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 371 (2009). 
384. See United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 966 n.14 (9th Cir. 2013) (defending the 
reasonable suspicion requirement as a “modest, workable standard”). 
385. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493 (citation omitted). 
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3. Digital Border Searches After Riley 
Cotterman, Saboonchi, and Kim each made significant contributions 
to the debate over digital border searches. But the debate should develop 
further. Riley supports reexamining whether to apply the border search 
exception to digital searches. Given the Supreme Court’s conclusion that 
digital searches can be more intrusive than the search of a home, and are 
fundamentally different from searches of a person or physical property, 
courts could reasonably conclude under Riley’s balancing test that the 
exception does not apply. In that case, they must revert to the warrant 
requirement, unless some other exception applies.  
But even if courts conclude that the exception does apply, there are 
two main reasons why they should require either probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion.  
First, Riley’s recognition of the intrusiveness of digital searches and 
its categorical distinction between digital and physical searches indicate 
that courts should treat digital searches as nonroutine.
386
 Riley’s 
application of the same protection to flip phones and smartphones, as 
well as its preference for a categorical rule, weigh in favor of applying 
the same rule for all digital searches and doing away with the distinction 
between manual and forensic searches.
387
 Moreover, Arnold and Ickes 
are based on reasoning that is flawed in light of Riley.
388
 The Ninth and 
Fourth circuits are free to reject those decisions after Riley and at least 
extend the reasonable suspicion requirements in Cotterman and 
Saboonchi to all digital searches.  
Second, after concluding that digital searches are nonroutine, courts 
should also consider whether to require probable cause, which will 
require a similar form of the balancing test under Riley. Although the 
debate over digital border searches has focused on reasonable suspicion, 
the Supreme Court has never stated or held that all nonroutine searches 
can be justified by that standard. Rather, it has expressly reserved the 
question as to the appropriate level of suspicion.
389
 Lower courts have 
generally required reasonable suspicion for nonroutine searches, rather 
than probable cause, but they have defined nonroutine searches by their 
level of intrusiveness.
390
 Riley’s recognition of the unique intrusiveness 
                                                     
386. See supra notes 115–25 and accompanying text (discussing intrusiveness as the quality that 
marks a nonroutine border search). 
387. See supra notes 349—53. 
388. See supra Part III.B. 
389. E.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 n.4 (1985). 
390. See supra notes 115–25 and accompanying text. 
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of a digital search supports a probable cause standard. 
CONCLUSION 
Every year, millions of people travel into and out of the United States 
with a cell phone, tablet, laptop, or some other electronic device. These 
travelers routinely carry massive amounts of private and confidential 
information, from personal correspondence to health or banking 
information, intellectual property, attorney-client documents, and 
location information. This information may be stored locally, on the 
device, or on remote servers, in the cloud. 
U.S. border officials search and seize digital information without any 
suspicion of criminal activity, on the proposition that digital searches are 
no different from physical ones. Until recently, federal courts have 
accepted this view. The Ninth Circuit and one federal district court have 
required border officials to demonstrate reasonable suspicion before 
conducting a forensic digital search. But these decisions still permit 
intrusive digital searches that fall short of a “forensic” search, and 
impose only the lowest Fourth Amendment standard.  
Riley should lead to significant changes in the digital border search 
doctrine. Courts should reconsider whether to extend the border search 
exception to digital searches, drawing on Riley’s balancing test. Riley 
supports the conclusion that digital searches—which can be even more 
intrusive than the search of one’s home—fall outside the scope of the 
border search exception, which is traditionally justified by the 
government’s interest in preventing unwanted people and contraband 
from entering the country. But even if courts find the border search 
exception applies, Riley should lead them to treat digital searches as 
nonroutine searches requiring reasonable suspicion or probable cause. 
 
